Notes and Comments by unknown
Cornell Law Review
Volume 27
Issue 1 December 1941 Article 10
Notes and Comments
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Notes and Comments, 27 Cornell L. Rev. 90 (1941)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol27/iss1/10
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law: State Liability: Criminal Law: Suspension of the
right to sue under Section 5101 of the New York Penal Law.--The re-
cent decision of Lehrman v. State of New York, 176 Misc. 1022, 29 N. Y. S.
(2d) 635 (Ct. Cl. 1941) attempts to define the civil status of the paroled con-
vict. Claimant, at the time the claim was filed, was a prisoner on parole. His
suit, brought under Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act1 was for damages re-
sulting from personal injuries allegedly caused by employees of the state while
claimant was incarcerated in a state prison. The Court held that the claimant
was disabled, under Section 510 of the Penal Law,2 from bringing suit. The
Court of Appeals had recently decided in the important case of Green v.
State of New Yorks that the right of an inmate of a state prison to legal re-
dress against the state itself is suspended under Section 510. Section 8 did
not erase the disability stated in general terms by the penal provision. The
present case extends the Green holding by including paroled convicts within
the group affected by Section 510. The Court reasoned that since a paroled
prisoner remains within the legal custody of the warden of his prison, though
he is physically liberated, his sentence has not terminated; and he, therefore,
has not been restored to his "civil rights," which are suspended during
"the term of the sentence."
In the instant case, the decision might well have been considered forced
by antecedent authority.4 Yet it should be pointed out that the conclusion of
1COURT OF CLAIMS AcT § 8 reads: "The state hereby waives its immunity from
liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined
in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations
of this article ......
This section was added by L. 1939, c. 860 and became effective July 1, 1939. It re-
places former Section 12-a of the Court of Claims Act. Section 9 (2) of the Act confers
jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear a claim against the state for the torts of
its officers or employees (and for breach of contract and appropriation of real and
personal property as well). The substance of former Sectiod 12-a of the Act is to be
found in the present Sections 8 and 9 (2). For detailed analysis of the background and
legal effect of former Section 12-a see MacDonald, Substantivq Liability of the State of
New York, Adjective Law in Court of Claims, (1929) 1 N. Y. S. B. A. BULL. 235; and
notes (1920) 5 CORNELL L. Q. 320; (1931) 16 CORNELL L. Q. 359; (1936) 22 CORNELL
L. Q. 287; (1937) 23 CORNELL L. Q. 184.2N. Y. PEN. LA-W § 510 provides: "A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison for any
term less than life forfeits all the public offices, and suspends, during the term of the
sentence, all the civil rights, and all private trusts, authorities, or powers of, or held by,
the person sentenced."
Sixteen states have legislation similar to Section 510: Arizona, California, Idaho,
Kansas, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and
Utah. Kansas expressly gives the power to contract. All but New York, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota add the power to convey. Utah includes the
power to sue.
3278 N. Y. 15, 14 N. E. (2d) 833 (1938). See also Note (1937)1 23 CORNELL L. Q.
184.4 People ex rel. Kwizynski v. Hunt, 250 App. Div. 378, 294 N. Y. Supp. 276 (4th
Dep't 1937) cert. denied, 303 U. S. 654, 58 Sup. Ct. 755 (1938) ; People ex rel. Forsyth
v. Court of Session, 141 N. Y. 288, 36 N. E. 386 (1894); People ex rel. Cecere v.
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the present case rests entirely on the basis of a narrow distinction between
commutation and parole. A commutation, said the Court, reduces and termi-
nates a sentence, whereas this is not true of a parole. The Court cites Sec-
tion 241 of the Correction Law" for, this proposition.5 But Section 241 was
included in the general amendment of Article 9 of the Correction Law in
1935,6 and the reduction of sentence provided thereby, formerly described by
that article as either commutation (i.e. ordinarily descriptive of a reduction
for good behavior in prison) or compensation (i.e., ordinarily descriptive
of a reduction for efficient and willing performance of duties), 7 definitely
subjects the released prisoner to the jurisdiction of the parole board and pro-
vides that he remain in the "legal custody" of the warden of his prison
"until the expiration of the term of his sentence." Obviously we must dis-
tinguish between (a) the statutory type of commutation provided for by
Section 241 and now described as a reduction, which does not terminate
the prisoner's sentence and therefore does not restore him to civil rights,
and (b) the type of commutation which is an exercise of executive clemency,
empowered by Article 4, Section 4 of the New York State Constitution and
not by statute, to which conditions may be attached and which therefore may
or may not terminate the suspension of the convict's civil rights.9 The un-
fortunate confusion of terms in this field, commutation, compensation, and
now parole, has already been noted 3° This confusion was originally the fault
Jennings, 250 N. Y. 239, 165 N. E. 282 (1929); Green v. Statei of New York, 278
N. Y. 15, 14 N. E. (2d) 833 (1938); White v. State of New York, 166 Misc. 481,
2 N. Y. S. (2d) 582, 260 App. Div. i413, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 526, aff'd, 285 N. Y. 728,
34 N. E. (2d) 896 (1941).
6N. Y. CoaR. LAw § 241 provides that: "The Governor, upon receipt of the report
recommending the allowance of reduction of sentence of prisoners as provided in this
article may, in'his discretion, allow the same, in whole or in part, as to any or all of
such prisoners. . . .Every such prisoner shall thereupon be allowed to go on parole
outside of said prisonlwalls and'inclosure upon such terms and conditions as the board
of parole for state prison shall prescribe, but to remain while so on parole in the legal
custody andunder the control of the warden of the state prison from which he is so
released until the expiration of the term of his sentence ......
6L. 1935, c. 902; see Report, Recommendations and Studies of New York Law Re-
vision Commission (1935), Leg. Doe. No. 60 (I), 477-573.7Report, Recommendation and Studies of New York Law Revision Commission, op. cit.
supra at 481, 492-494, 498-503.8See note 5, supra.
ON. Y. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 4, and N. Y. CODE CaiM. PROC..§ '692-696. In White v.
State of New York, referred to by the court in the principal case,. it is to be noted that
the commutation involved was granted in the exercise of executive clemency; although
the condition of report to the parole board was attached, this did not prevent suit against
the state in the period during which such report was to be made. Whether an executive
commutation, with conditions annexed, restores the prisoner's civil rights depends on
whether the conditions are precedent or subsequent. If thd latter, the suspension of civil
rights is dissolved. A fortiori when the Governor unconditionally commutes that part
of the sentence not yet served the sentence is terminated and civil rights reinstated. Appli-
cation of White, 166 Misc. 481, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 582 (Ct. Cl. 1940).
loCf. note 7, supra. The Commission recommended that the original distinction between
commutation and compensation be abandoned, and that to avoid confusion, the term
"reduction" (now used in Article 9 of the Correction Law] be used as a generic term for
all diminution of sentence for good conduct and for efficient and willing performance of
duties assigned.
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of the legislature; it would bI6 well to have more accurate verbiage used by
the courts."
The immediate holding of the principal case, i.e., that a paroled prisoner
is not permitted to sue the state, raises a broader issue. Is he deprived of
the right to legal redress not only against the state but against an individual
party as well? In the light of the Court's reasoning and terminology that
conclusion seems inescapable. The denial of the right to sue by Section 510
has already been held to apply to proceedings against individuals as well as
the state.1
2
The instant case, therefore, leaves the paroled prisoner, like the incarcer-
ated inmate, without any redress for civil wrongs committed against him.
He may find himself the subject of ,assault, battery, false imprisonment, con-
version, trespass, slander, libe1' 3 -indeed we may run the whole gamut of
tort actions and find apparently none for which he can obtain relief. He will
not be permitted to avail himself of workmen's compensation for he cannot
sue the insurer. He cannot institute divorce or separation proceedings. 14
Even a contract, such as an accident insurance policy, will be of no avail to
him though contracted before sentence was imposed. Yet, while he is deprived
of the right to sue, civil proceedings brought against him are freely per-
mitted.' 5
It is true that the statute of limitations applying to the convict's claim is
suspended by statute in certain actions,' 6 but, apparently, the period is not
to exceed ten years in any case, 17 hardly enough to be satisfactory where one
has been sentenced to a long maximum term. Even if the statute of limita-
tions were tolled during the entire term, it would not be effective since the
defendant may have died or become insolvent, witnesses may have dis-
appeared, and proof may have been lost during the long interval of time.
It is likewise true that via special enabling statutes, a prisoner or paroled
convict may obtain the right to sue.' 8 But such enactments are difficult to
obtain and also have the effect of clogging legislative and executive affairs.
Their use is not to be recommended.
It is submitted that the existing law relating to the suspension of a paroled
"See, for example: "On May 23, 1928, the Governor commuted this sentence .... On
August q15, 1935, relator was returned to prison as a parole violator." Page v. Brophy,248 App. Div. 309, 310, 289 N. Y. Supp. 362 (4th Dep't 1936), appeal di4'nissed 277
N. Y. 673, 14 N. E. (2d) 384 (1938). (Italics supplied.)
"What seems to be lost sight of is thatiparole has to do with the grantor denial of
reduction in term, the cominutation of an indeterminate sentence .... " People ex rel.
Montana v. McGee, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 162 (Sup. Ct. 1939). (Italics supplied.)
12Bonnell v. Rome, W. & 0. R. Ry., 251 App. Div. 110, 12 Hun. 218 (4th Dep't
1877) ; Jones v. Jones, 249 App. Div. 470, 292 N. Y. Supp. 705 (3d Dep't 1937) ; Brook-
man v. Brookman, 161 Misc. 741, 292 N. Y. Supp. 918 (Sup. Ct. 1937) ; Op. Att'y. Gen.
(1933) 529-30; Note (1918) 3 CORNELL L. Q. 298.
13Op. Att'y. Gen. (1933) 519.
14Jones v. Jones, 249 App. Div. 470, 292 N. Y. Supp. 705 (3d Dep't 1937).
15Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317,'18 N. E. 148 (1888) ; In rd-Webers' Estate, 165
Misc. 815, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 809 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
16N. Y. Civ. PRAC. AcT §§ 43, 60.
'Vibid.
'
5 Tomaselli v. State, 168 Misc. 674, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 435 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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prisoner's right to sue runs counter to the very policy underlying the insti-
tution of parole. Modern penology aims toward rehabilitation of the pris-
oner' 9 and depends largely upon the individual's own effort for his successful
readjustment to normal living. Deprived of a right of access to the courts,
the prisoner is unequipped to engage successfully in any legitimate business
activity. The financial insecurity that follows may easily result either in the.
prisoner's failure to develop into a normal citizen or in his reversion to
criminal but lucrative ventures.
As a form of punishment the denial of the right to sue would seem to be
open to criticism on grounds of policy. The almost unanimous view of sociol-
ogists and criminologists is that " . . . punishment is decreasingly effective
either in reforming or deterring... "20 criminals. A form of punishment which
operates principally after physical release of the prisoner and is uneven in its
application, depending on the fortuitous circumstances of the individual
prisoner, seems unlikely to reform, or defer one from crime. Further, the
question of prison discipline, which may be a consideration in the withholding
of an inmate's right to sue, has no importance in the instance of a physically
liberated prisoner on parole.
It is clear that under Section 510, the inmate and paroled prisoner lose
other civil rights and privileges as well. But in the words of the Court of
Appeals, "It is difficult to ascertain precisely what the legislature meant by
the words 'civil rights' ,.21 Cases in point are not abundant. It is evident,
however, that political rights, such as the right of suffrage and the right to
hold office are forfeited. 22 So also is the right to practice a profession or
engage in a business the pursuit of which calls for a license or permission from
the state.23 In the case of the imprisoned felon as contrasted with a paroled
prisoner, loss of personal liberty and the benefits of his own labor are, of
course, part and parcel of Section 510. He does- not forfeit his real property,
however, as was the case at common law.2 The right to accept and convey
real property by grant or devise is preserved.2 5 A prisoner furthermore is
competent to testify as a witness ini any action.2 6 He may contract, but as
19People ex rel Montana v. McGee, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 162 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ;. LA RoE,
PAROLE WITH HONOR (1st ed. 1939) ; NeW York Proceedings of Governor's Conference
on Crime (1935) ; Ulman, A National Program to Develop Probation and Parole (1938)
29 J. CRIer. L. 477.20Sutherland, Person Versus Act In Crimintology (1928) 14 CoRNELmL L. Q. 165.21Bowles v. H-abermann, 95 N. Y. 24 (1884).22N. Y. PEN. LAW § 510 recites: "A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison ...
forfeits all the public offices... . " See Matter of Lindgren, 232 N. Y. 59, 133 N. E.
353 (1921) dismissing appeal from 198 App. Div. 319, 190 N. Y. S. 321 (1st Dep't 1921).
23N. Y. PEN. LAw § 510 provides : "A sentence of imprisonment in a state prison...
forfeits . . . all private trusts, authority, or powers of, or held by, thd person sentenced."
Cf. Op. Att'y. Gen. (1933) 529.24N. Y. PEN. LAw § 512. La Chappelle v. Burpee, 69 Hun. 436, 23 N. Y. S. 453 (4th
Dep't 1893) ; It re Weber's Estate, 165 Misc. 815, 1 N. Y. S. (2d). 809 (Surr. Ct.
1938). At Common law a felon's property was confiscated. Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE'S CoM-
MENTARIES (1941 ed.) 381. Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317, 18 N. E. 148 (1888).25Avery v. Everett, 110 N. Y. 317, 18 N. E. 148 (1888); Kugel v. Kalic, 176 Misc.
49, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 327 (Sup. Ct. 1941).26N. Y. PEN. LAw .k 2444; N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. AcT § 350.
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pointed out above, cannot sue to enforce an agreement.2 7
It remains for future holdings to sketch the details within the boundaries
outlined by the broad term "civil rights". But it must be clear that little can
be said in support of continuing the denia' of the right to legal redress. The
modern trend of our states is to depart from the strict rule prohibiting a
.prisoner from suing civilly ;28 and New York, always the leader in the matter
of parole, is now falling behind the lead taken by other jurisdictions. It is to
be hoped that the legislature will see fit to restore this right to convicts and
paroled prisoners in the interests both of justice and of progressive penology.2 9
Louis Pollack
Admiralty: Death on the High Seas Act: Seaplanes: Venue.r-In an ac-
tion at law in a United States District Court for death caused to a passenger
in a carrier's1 seaplane crossing the Pacific Ocean,2 the administrator was
2 7 Stephani v. Lent, 30 Misc. 346, 63 N. Y. Supp. 471 (Sup. Ct. 1900).28See W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie 1937), §§ 28-5-33 to 28-5-36 providing for com-
mittees for convicts and § 36 reciting that: "Such committed may sue and be sued in
respect to debts due to or from such convict and respecting all other causes of action
for which the convict may sue or be sued had no such incarceration taken place. . .
"The doctrine that convicts should have redress of personal injuries inflicted upon
them through the negligence or wantonness of another is consonant with modern con-
ception in respect of the proper relationship between society and convicted persons."
Moss v. Hyer, 114 W. Va. 584, 588, 172 S. E. 795 (1934). Utah by express statute per-
mits a convict to sue. Colorado and Mississippi also have very lenient statutes. Kansas
grants the convict express power to contract. Thirty-one jurisdictions, furthermore,
have no statute at all resembling Section 510 of the New York Penal: Law. See also
Wilson v, King, 59 Ark. 32, 26 S. W. 18 (1894); State v. Williams, 48 N. D. 1259,
189 N. W. 625 (1922).
Cf. Highway Commissioner v. Industrial Accident Commission, 200 Cal. 44, 251 Pac.
808 (1926) discussing the California "Convict Road Camp Bill", permitting the convict
to sue the state for workmen's compensation despite his imprisonment.
This trend of our states is in line with an increased use of the parole device. Parole
is becoming the rule rather than the exception. U. S. Dep't. Commerce, Bureau of
Census, Prisonmrs in States and Federal Prisons and Reformatories (1932) 112-114.2 91n Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731, 139 Pac. 948 (1914) the Court,
in commenting upon a statute precisely like Section 510 of the New York Penal Law,
said: " . . . The principles of law which this verbiage liberally imposes had its origin in
the fogs and fictions of feudal jurisprudence and doubtlessly have been brought forward
into modern statutes without fully realizing either the effect of its liberal significance
or the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of government."
"Though convicted of crime, they (convicts) are human beings and are entitled to
every right and consideration of any other person, except the loss of liberty and the im-
position of hard labor upon them for a fixed period." Branton v. Washington Co., 79
Miss. 277, 283, 30 S. E. 659 (1901).
It should be noted that the subject is on the list of proposals for future consideration
reported by the New York Law Revision Commission in 1940 and 1941. N. Y. Leg. Doc.
(1940) No. 65, 16; N. Y. Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65, 14.
1 Since there are no facts to the contrary in the report it is presumed that the seaplane
was a "carrier" as distinguished from a "charter" craft. For a distinction between a
"passenger" and "charterer" see Curtis-Wright Flying Service v. Glose, 66 F. (2d) 710
(C. C. A. 3d 1933).
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allowed to recover under the federal Death on the High Seas Act of 1920.
Frank Choy, Adn'r v. Pan-American Airways Company, 1941 Am. Mar. Cas.
483 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
The two significant questions raised were: (1) Does this statute allow a
recovery for wrongful death in a seaplane? (2) Can such an action, if allowed,
be prosecuted in a district court in law as well as in admiralty? The court
answered both of these questions in the affirmative.
In the absence of statute, under the general maritime law as well as under
common law, there is no right to recover damages for a death arising from a
maritime tort.3 The theory is that "the injury died with the person and money
damages could not compensate for the loss of life."4 One of the federal statutes
passed in 1920, the Seamen's (Jones) Act, gives seamen a right to recover for
wrongful death or injury.5 The other, known as the Death on the High Seas
Act," allows a personal representative of any decedent to maintain an action
for wrongful death on the high seas. The latter statute was invoked in the
instant case.7
As the court pointed out, the language of the Death on the High Seas Act
antedated the establishment of transoceanic commerce, but it found "no reason
to call [it] a navigation and shipping law. The language of the statute makes
no reference to the navigation of vessels nor to any feature of their construction
or operation." It is true that the Death on the High Seas Act is to be found
in the United States Code under "Title 46, Shipping"; but the court said,
2The headnote states that the "airplane vanished during an overseas flight," although
the report makes no mention of the circumstances under which the decedent lost his life.3Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 42 Sup. Ct. 89 (1921) ; The Harrisburg,
119 U. S. 199, 213, 7 Sup. Ct. 140 (1889) ; Klingseisen v. Costanzo Transportation Co.,
101 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 3d 1939) ; Young v. Clyde S. S. Co., 294 Fed. 549 (S. D.
Fla. 1923) ; Glaser, Recovery For Injuries and Death in Admiralty (1938) 8 LAw Soc.
J. 322; ROBINSON, ADnIRALTY (1939) 135 ff.4 Glaser, supra note 3, at 326.
541 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1928). Presuming that the craft vanished
with all hands, are the members of the crew to be classified as "seamen" and do they
have a right of action under the Jones Act of 1920? If not so classed, are they also to
be allowed a recovery under the Death on the High Seas Act?
641 STAT. 537 (1920) 46 U. S. C. § 761 (1928) : "Right of Action: Where and by
Whom Brought. Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in
the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the
decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person,
or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued."
In addition to this statute the plaintiff pleaded four other causes of action: (1) a claim
under the Death Statute of Nevada, where defendant was incorporated; (2) a claim
under the Death Act of New York, where defendant has a place of business and where
the plaintiff purchased his ticket; (3) a claim under the Warsaw Convention of
October 12, 1929; (4) a claim under the laws and statutes of the Philippine Islands. The
claims under the Nevada and New York -statutes were dismissed on the ground that the
law of the place of wrong covers the right of action for wrongful death. The Warsaw
Convention was held inapplicable since there is no enabling statute thereto, and
Philippine law is a question of fact to be determined by a separate litigation. See a dis-
cussion of the Warsaw Convention in Note (1940) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 125.
8Per Clancy, J., at p. 485.
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"The fact that the Death on the High Seas Act is included in Title 46 does not
necessarily require its definition as a shipping statute." 9  The court's con-
struction of the statute was not contested by the defendant who devoted its
argument to the assertion that the suit at law, even in a United States district
court, was improper because it could lie only in an admiralty court.
Despite this general acquiesence in the propriety of bringing the case within
the Death on the High Seas Act of 1920, the decision presents some difficulty
in fitting it into the present pattern concerning the status of the seaplane as
a subject of admiralty jurisdiction. That a seaplane is not a vessel for
admiralty jurisdiction is apparently the weight of authority.'0 Such aircraft
is not subject to the general shipping and navigation laws of the United
States.' Some authorities contend that a seaplane is subject to admiralty
while afloat but not while in the air.' 2  Supporting this point of view, Judge
Cardozo said some years ago that "a hydro-aeroplane, while afloat upon waters
capable of navigation, is subject to the admiralty because location and function
stamp it as a means of water transportation.' 3 Whether the seaplane in the
9At p. 485.
'
0 Dollins v. Pan-American Grace Airways, 27 F. Supp. 487 (S. D. N. Y. 1939),
1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 691, 1939 U. S. Av. Rep. 6, and Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd.,
29 F. Supp. 412 (S. D. N. Y. 1939), 1939 Am. Mar. Cas. 148, 1939 U. S. Av. Rep. 1
(seaplane is not a vessel within the meaning of the limitation of liability statute in admir-
alty), (1940) 26 CORNELL L. Q. 124; United States v. Northwest Air Service, Inc., 80 F.
(2d) 805 (C. C. A. 9th 1935) (seaplane stored in a hangar nol subject to a maritime
lien) ; Foss v. Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215 Fed. 269 (S. D. Wash. 1914) (airplane not
subject to maritime lien for salvage and repairs) ; Wendorff v. Missouri State Life In-
surance Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S. W. (2d) 99, (1927) (seaplane is an air vehicle even when
forced down into the sea) ; People ex rel. Cushing v. Smith, 119 Misc. 294, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1922) (seaplane is not within the statute requiring mufflers on
maritime vessels); Opinion of the Attorney General, Calif., 1937 U. S. Av. Rep. 141
(seaplane is not a vessel for purposes of taxation) ; Watson v. R. C. A. Victor Co., 50
L1. L. R. 77, 1935 U. S. Av. Rep. 147 (1934) (seaplane is not a ship or vessel for
salvage purposes). See also, N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1500 (hydroplanes are not deemed boats
or floating structures within the statute requiring mufflers on floating craft).
144 STAT. 572 (1926), 49 U. S. C. § 177 (1940) : "The navigation and shipping laws of
the United States, including any definition of 'vessel' or 'vehicle' found therein and in-
cluding the rules for the prevention of collisions, shall not be construed to apply to
seaplanes or other aircraft or to the navigation of vessels in relation to seaplanes or
other aircraft."1 2 UNIFORm AERoNAuTics AcT, § 1: "A hydroplane, while at rest on water and -while
being operated on or immediately above water, shall be governed by the rules regarding
water navigation; while being operated through the air otherwise than immediately above
water, it shall be treated as an aircraft." See also, N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 245 (12)
requiring seaplanes on water to navigate according to United States regulations governing
navigation of watercraft, and provisions for lights and fog signals in sub-sections (23) and
(27) ; Judgment of the Seeamt Stettin, 1 Archiv. ffir Luftrecht, (1931) 2 J. AIR L. 588
(seaplane is a ship when it lands on water, voluntarily or involuntarily, unless it is a wreck
before it reaches the water) ; Opinion of the Attorney General, Wis., 1930 U. S. Av. Rep.
288 (a hydroplane is a boat propelled by means of a motor attached to propellors moving
in the air) ; New Jersey Board of Commerce and Navigation, 1930 U. S. Av. Rep. 193
(seaplane is subject to state statute requiring registration of power vessels) ; 1 BENEDICT
ON ADMIRALTY (5th ed. 1926) § 58.
13 Matter of Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N. Y. 115, 118, 133 N. E.
371, 18 A. L. R. 1324, (1921). See Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws
(1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333, 338, in which the author states that by assuming a single
definition of "vessel" the conclusion of the court is reached by "mechanical jurisprudence."
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case under discussion was afloat for any period of time before it disappeared
is not stated in the report. It may be questioned if this factor should be
considered seriously by the court at all. Where a seaplane had made a
forced landing and remained afloat before overturning and drowning a
passenger, it has been held that although the vessel was on the water it was
still "a mechanical device for aerial navigation" and that the insurer, whose
accident policy excepted injury or death while the insured was "in or on"
such a device, was protected by the exception. 14
The defense in the main case made much of the question of venue. It is
presented by the clause in the Death Act providing that "the representative...
may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States,
in admiralty. ' ul5 To the defendant this meant that the "may" was to be read
as "must"; that the statute permitted the suit, as the general admiralty law did
not, but confined the suit to an admiralty court. But the court held that the
action "in admiralty" is permissive and not mandatory. This conclusion has
some support on the related question whether a state common law court may
entertain an action for damages for wrongful death on the high seas.16 Ap-
parently the question has been considered only in New York where it has
been held that the state court does have jurisdiction."' Only one federal case
has been found squarely on the issue that an action brought in a district court
may be at law as well as in admiralty, and it was in a New York federal
district.' 8 On the other hand, a considerable group of authorities, even in the
New York state courts and New York districts, maintain that the venue is
exclusive in admiralty.' 9 Interestingly, another court in the southern New
York district had declared only two months previous to the present action that
"... in construing section 761 (of the Death on the High Seas Act) .... the
word 'may' used therein is mandatory and not permissive.
20
Tozier Brown
Contract: Restitution: Paying another's debt.-A trustee in bankruptcy
of a construction corporation was denied recovery of taxes paid by that
14Wendorff v. Missouri Life Ins. Co., 318 Mo. 363, 1 S. W. (2d) 99 (1927).
141 STAT. 537 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 761 (1928).
'
6The Juneal, Elliot v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 739 (2d Dep't 1938), 4 N. Y. S.
(2d) 794, (1938) Am. Mar. Cas. 494, (1938) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 107; followed in: Murphy
v. Steinfeldt, 254 App. Div. 741, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (2d Dep't 1938) ; Colbert v. Steinfeldt,
255 App. Div. 790, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 373 (2d Dep't 1938) ; Kristiansen v. Steinfeldt, 256
App. Div. 824, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 790 (2d Dep't 1939); Wyman and Bartlett, Exec'rs v.
Pan-American Airways, Inc., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1941). See also Powers
v. Cunard S. S. Co., 32 F. (2d) 720 (S. D. N. Y. 1925) (conferring jurisdiction on the
admiralty court does not affect the jurisdiction of any other court).
"'See cases cited supra note 14.
18The Saturnia, 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 469 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
19 The Silver Palm, 79 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 9th 1935) ; Birks v. United Fruit Co.,
Inc., 48 F. (2d) 656, (S. D. N. Y. 1930) ; Matter of Rademaker, 166 Misc. 201, 2 N. Y. S.
(2d). 309 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Matter of the Estate of George Nelson, 168 Misc. 161, 5
N. Y. S. (2d) 398 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Tivives, 1931 Am. Mar. Cas. 68 (S. D. N. Y. 1930) ;
Dall v. Consulich Societa Triestina Di Navigazione, 1936 Am. Mar. Cas. 359 (S. D.
N. Y., 1928).2OEgan v. Donaldson Atlantic Lines, 37 F. Supp. 909, 910 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
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corporation on behalf of defendant realty corporation, whose stock the con-
struction corporation had pledged as collateral at a bank, where the principal
stockholders of both corporations who authorized said payments as officers
of the construction corporation had no actual or apparent authority to bind
the realty corporation by a contract implied in fact to make such reimburse-
ment. Further, the evidence failed to prove that such payments were made
with the expectation that the construction company would be reimbursed.
Chinnery et al. v. Kennosset Realty Co., Inc., 286 N. Y. 167 36 N. E. (2d)
97 (1941).
Although the principal case correctly denies recovery on an alleged contract
implied in fact, the court rather summarily dismissed the possibility of recovery
on other grounds by labeling the construction company a "mere volunteer."
It is the purpose of this note to examine the possibilities of a recovery, in the
absence of a contract, for benefits conferred by one who intentionally makes
a payment of money on another's behalf. The problem may be illustrated
as follows: when A, unauthorized by B, intentionally pays a sum of money to
discharge a debt for which B is primarily liable, for example pays his taxes,
will A, assuming the absence of a contract on which to base recovery, be
allowed to recover from B to the extent of the benefit received by B from the
money paid, which will usually be that sum itself?
It is a well known principle of the common law that one person cannot
make another person his debtor by paying his debts without his request
or consent.' To this general principle the courts have admitted a broad
exception: a person is justified in satisfying a debt for which another is
primarily liable if he does so in what is substantially self-defence, that is,
where he has some color of interest of his own to protect by his voluntary pay-
ment.2 Voluntary payers of another's taxes having such a protectable interest
in the property subject to the tax, are not considered intermeddlers, interlopers,
or officious volunteers, and are usually awarded some form of reimbursement.
For instance, it is well established that a mortgagee has a right to pay taxes
assessed against the mortgaged premises,3 even in the absence of a "tax clause"
in the mortgage, in order to protect his security.4 This right has'been extended
also to a stockholder and director of a financially insecure corporation,5 to a
'1 WILLISrON" ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1936) §§ 22A, 36A;
5 id. § 1479, n. 13; Burhert v. Caroline, 31 Wash. 62, 71 Pac. 724, 96 Am. St. Rep. 889
(1903). See also Thomson v. Thomson, 76 App. Div. 178, 78 N. Y. Supp. 389 (3d Dep't
1902) ; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937)Y§ 2,//o42MCMillan v. O'Brien, 219 Cal. 775, 29 P. (2d) 183 (1934); Dunlop v. James, 174
N. Y. 411, 67 N. E. 60 (1903) ; Sidenberg v. Ely et al., 90 N. Y. 257, 43 Am. Rep. 163
(1882) ; Olson v. Chapman, 4 Wash. (2d) 522, 104 P. (2d) 344 (1940).3First National Bank of Boston v. Proctor, 40 F. (2d) 841 (C. C. A. 1st 1930);
Choate v. Board of Assessors of the City of Boston, 304 Mass. 298, 23 N. E. (2d) 882
(1939) ; Dunlop v. James, 174 N. Y. 411, 67 N. E. 60 (1903); Sidenberg v. Ely et al.,
90 N. Y. 257, 43 Am. Rep. 163 (1882) ; Integrity Trust Co. v. St. Rita Bldg. and Loan
Ass'n, 317 Pa. 518, 177 At. 5 (1935).4Sidenberg v. Ely et al., 90 N. Y. 257, 43 Am. Rep. 163 (1882).
5Valdosta Bank and Trust Co. v. Pendleton, 145 Ga. 336, 89 S. E. 216 (1916) ; see also
Morelock v. Morgan & Bird Gravel Co., Inc., 174 La. 658, 141 So. 368 (1932), where the
court based recovery on a Louisiana statute which provided that the tax collector is
authorized to receive payment from any person other than the person in whose name
the property is *assessed, and to subrogate the payer to all rights, liens, and mortgages of
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cotenant who paid taxes assessed against the whole of the common property,6
and, to an owner of mineral rights in land who paid taxes assessed against
the surface owner.7 Devisees and legatees, too, have been set apart from
the ranks of outlawed volunteers when they voluntarily paid taxes assessed
against the testator during his lifetime in order to prevent a forfeiture of
the testator's property;8 and the same policy favors the remainderman of a
life estate who has paid taxes assessed against the property prior to the death
of the life tenant.9 In Pennsylvania, the purchaser of realty at a foreclosure
sale, on paying delinquent taxes, has been subrogated to the rights of the
taxing authority in order to enforce the personal liability of the former owner.10
In the principal case, the whole scheme of incorporating the defendant realty
corporation by the controlling stockholders of the construction company, and
the subsequent use of all the former's stock as collateral, was expressly
recognized by the court to be merely a more subtle way of mortgaging the
realty so as not to jeopardize the construction company's position with its
creditors. The court further admitted that it was beneficial to the construction
company to comply with the demand of its creditor (the bank which held the
realty corporation's stock as collateral) to pay the taxes and thus keep good
the collateral security. It is submitted that this beneficial interest satisfied the
requirement of a protectable interest."
In addition to establishing the requisite protectable interest, the plaintiff
must also prove that when such payments were made, there was an expectation
of reimbursement.' 2 Where a tax must be paid by one person in self-defence
the state and parish. For a similar statute in Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)§ 2210.6Bank of Tupelo v. Collier, 191 Ga. 852, 14 S. E. (2d) 59 (1941) ; Olson v. Chapman,
4 Wash. (2d) 522, 104 P. (2d) 344 (1940) ; cf. Wilson v. Sanger, 57 App. Div. 323, 68
N. Y. Supp. 124 (3d Dep't 1901) where the court held that the owner of an undivided
interest in land had no interest to protect by paying taxes on the whole property, since by
statute he may pay his proportionate share of the entire tax and relieve his share from
sale and from the tax burden.
7CooLEY ON TAxATIOx (4th ed. 1924) § 1260; Cochran et al. v. Godard, 182 Okla. 506,
78 P. (2d) 692 (1938) ; Camden v. Fink Coal & Coke Co., 106 W. Va. 312, 145 S. E. 575
(1928), 61 A. L. R. 584 (1929).
SEatherly v. Winn, 185 Miss. 742, 189 So. 99 (1939) ; In re Cronise's Estate, 167 Misc.
310, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 392 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
911 re McCarty's Estate, 158 Misc. 287, 285 N. Y. Supp. 641 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Eddy v.
Leath, 26 Ohio C. C. 645, aff'd w. op., 74 Ohio St. 462, 78 N. E. 1124 (1906).
lOTrustees of General Assembly, Etc. v. Ward, 22 F. Supp. 579 (E. D. Pa. 1938) ; In
Land Title Bank & Trust Co. v. Ward, 20 F. Supp. 810 (E. D. Pa. 1937), the court
stated: " . . . in Pennsylvania, personal liability for taxes is an incident to the ownership
of land. This is settled by authority. . . . (citing cases)"11Where the courts have found that the voluntary payer of another's taxes had a
protectable interest to safeguard in the property assessed, they have allowed him to
recover taxes paid in order to prevent his security, devise, undivided interest, etc., from
being forfeited. It is submitted that the construction corporation in the principal case
might have successfully argued that it had a protectable interest in preventing a forfeiture
of the defendant's realty which was, in fact, the real security for its loan at the bank.
121n the principal case, the construction company had paid taxes on the realty over a
long period of time, both before and after the defendant realty corporation \vas
organized to take over the realty. Because of this practice, the court presumed such
payments of taxes on the realty to be gratuitous, and having failed to find positive
evidence to rebut this presumption, the court concluded that such payments were made
without expectation of reimbursement.
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because the person primarily liable neglected to pay the tax, it would be an
unfortunate rule of law which would presume that such payments were
gratuitous, and that the delinquent taxpayer thereby became the recipient of a
windfall. On the other hand, such a situation would seem to warrant the
presumption that the taxpayer had thus purchased an equitable lien'3 en-
forceable under the doctrine of subrogation to the rights of the taxing
authority.14 This latter presumption would seem peculiarly applicable to the
principal case where the plaintiff was a trustee in bankruptcy representing
the rights of creditors, because if the payments are to be regarded as gratuities
to a sister corporation in which the controlling stockholders of the bankrupt
corporation were personally interested, such payments could only be considered
a fraud on creditors.15
Another possible form of relief obtainable is by way of restitution for the
full amount paid.16 Where property taxes are paid under a bona fide but
mistaken belief as to the taxpayer's ownership of the land, such payments are
not regarded, by the better view, as having been officiously paid and restitution
of the sum so paid has been granted.17 It would seem to follow that where
the plaintiff has a protectable interest, such interest would also support the
remedy of restitution. Proof of the owner's acceptance of the resulting benefit
need not be established solely on the old common law principle of ratification.' 8
The Restatement of Contracts has taken the view that the person whose debt
is paid is deemed to have accepted such benefits unless he exercises his right of
disclaimer within a reasonable time.19
In the principal case, the court did not examine these other possible grounds
on which a recovery might have been based. One obvious explanation for
this may have been the plaintiff's failure to include them in his pleadings. It
is also possible, however, that in its search for an authorized request on which
to make out a contract implied in fact, the court overlooked certain factors
present in the case which might have warranted their placing an unrequested
implied in law obligation on the defendant realty corporation to reimburse-the
plaintiff, and thus prevent the payments from being a simple gift of assets by
an insolvent debtor in fraud of creditors.20
Douglas S. Moore
13 in Pennsylvania (see supra, note 10), a personal right of action is given in addition
to the equitable lien on the property.
14Central Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Swenson, 222 Wis. 331, 267 N. W. 307 (1936), 106
A. L. R. 1207 (1937). For an excellent historical treatment of the doctrine of subrogation
in this situation, see Dunlop v. James, 174 N. Y. 411, 415-416, 67 N. E. 60, 61-62 (1903).
155 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) § 1534;
6 id. § 1739.
16Govern v. Russ, 125 Iowa 188, 100 N. W. 325 (325 4 -- oJ'A, -, .
175 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) § 1569, n.
'
5 Crumlish's Adm'r v. Central Improvement Co. et al., 38 W. Va. 390, 18 S. E. 456
(1893).
19Acceptance by ratification as opposed to that acceptance which results from a "failure
to make a timely disclaimer of benefits received," is discussed in 6 WILLISTON ON CON-
TRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson, 1937) §§ 1857 et seq.; RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS (1932) § 421; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937) § 112.20For a discussion of an analogous problem concerning the possibilities of recovery by
an alleged volunteer who has intentionally rendered unauthorized services for the benefit
of another, see 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. Williston and Thompson 1937) §
1479.
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Corporations: Liability of a corporation for wrongful transfer or refusal
to transfer stock.--In the case of Leff v. N. Kaufman's, Inc., 20 A. (2d)
786 (Pa. 1941), a stock certificate was held in trust by the record owner
Ray, one of the directors of the corporation, for plaintiff, president of the
corporation, and Kaufman, secretary of the corporation jointly. The cer-
tificate had been endorsed in blank by Ray and left in the stockbook which
was kept by the secretary of the corporation at his offices. Subsequently,
and without Ray's knowledge or permission, plaintiff detached and took
possession of the certificate. In a mandamus action to compel the corporation
and its officers to transfer and register the stock upon its books in his name,
plaintiff contended that his bare possession of the certificate, with the genuine
endorsement in blank of the registered owner, was sufficient under Sections 1,1
5,2 6,3 7,4 and 215 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 6 to establish his legal
IThis section states that title to a certificate of stock and the shares it represents can
be transferred only by delivery of the certificate indorsed, either in blank or to a specified
person, by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner of the shares represented
thereby, or by delivery of the certificate and a separate document containing a written
assignment or power of attorney to transfer the certificate signed by the person
appearing to be the owner. "The provisions of this section shall be applicable
although the charter or articles of incorporation or code of regulations or by laws of
the corporation issuing the certificate and the certificate itself, provide that the shares
represented thereby shall be transferable only on the books of the corporation or shall
be registered by a registrar or transferred by a transfer agent."
The Commissioners' Note states that the transfer of the certificate is made to operate
as a transfer of the shares, whereas at common law it was the registry on the books
of the company which made the complete transfer. The reason for this change is to
make the certificate the representative of the shares which is the fundamental purpose
of the whole act.2
"The delivery of a certificate to transfer title in accordance with the provisions of
section 1, is effectual, except as provided in section 7; though made by one having no
right of possession and having no authority from the owner of the certificate or from
the person purporting to transfer the title."
The Commissioners' Note states that although in giving full negotiability to certificates
of stock this section goes beyond the existing law, a similar result has been reached in
many cases on the theory of estoppel if the real owner's negligence contributed to the
theft or unauthorized dealing with an indorsed certificate.3
"The indorsement of a certificate by the person appearing by the certificate to be
the owner of the shares represented thereby is effectual, except as provided in section 7,
though the indorser or transferor (a) was induced by fraud, duress or mistake, to make
the indorsement or delivery, or (b) has revoked the delivery of the certificate, or the
authority given by the indorsement or delivery of the certificate, or (c) has died or become
legally incapacitated after the indorsement, whether before or after the delivery of the
certificate, or (d) has received no consideration."
The Commssioners' Note states that by the previous section, the delivery may be
made by any one if the certificate is properly indorsed; by the present section, if the
indorsement is genuine, it is sufficient in spite of the circumstances enumerated.
4 This section states that if the indorsement or delivery of a certificate was procured by
fraud, duress, or mistake, or if the delivery was without authority from the owner or after
his death or legal incapacity, the transfer may be rescinded unless the certificate has been
transferred to a bona fide purchaser, or the injured person has elected to waive the injury
or is barred by laches from enforcing his rights. "Any court of appropriate jurisdiction
may enforce specifically such right to retain the possession of the certificate or to
rescind the transfer thereof and, pending litigation, may enjoin the further transfer of
the certificate or impound it."
The Commissioners' Note states that no title should be valid against the original
owner unless a purchaser for value has -acquired the certificates.
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title to the shares; also, that the corporation was legally bound to recognize
him as owner until his title was avoided in another proceeding by the parties
in interest. Held: The Act does not make bare possession of the certificate,
endorsed in blank, legal ownership for all purposes; nor does it require the
corporation to recognize such possessor as owner regardless of its knowledge
of existing claims against his title. "It could not deliberately ignore the
conflicting claims, nor could it be compelled to assume the risk of their
solution."'7 The judgment on a directed verdict for the defendants was
affirmed.
A transferee of stock is entitled to have the stock registered' in his name
on the books of the corporation and a new certificate issued to him.8 The
refusal of the corporation to make the transfer may be an exercise of wrongful
dominion over the stock and the corporation may be held liable in an action
for conversion, for damages caused by the delay in making the transfer, or be
compelled to make the transfer in a proceeding in equity.9
The corporation, however, occupies a fiduciary relation toward its share-
holders and must be permitted to protect itself against possible liability for an
unauthorized or improper transfer.'0 Therefore, it may refuse to make a
transfer when it has reasonable ground for so doing although it must act
in good faith and present an adequate reason for the refusal.", Thus a corpora-
tion may properly refuse to transfer the shares on its books where the person
5This section provides that the person to whom a certificate was originally issued is
the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner thereof and the shares represented,
until he indorses the certificate to another specified person who then becomes the person
appearing to be the owner.
The court pointed out that this section had no application since the certificate was not
specifically endorsed to the plaintiff.
66 U. L. A.
'720 A. (2d) 786, 790.
SFirst Nat. Bank v. Pittsburgh, F. W. & C. Ry. Co., 31 F. Supp. 381 (D. C. Pa.
1940); Woodcliff Gin Co. v. Kittles, 173 Ga. 661, 161 S. E. 119 (1931) ; Hoosier Chemical
Works, Inc. v. Brown, 200 Ind. 535, 165 N. E. 323 (1929) ; Bancokentucky Co. v. Weil,
258 Ky. 243, 79 S. W. (2d) 977 (1935) ; Steindler v. Virginia Public Service Co., 163
Va. 462, 175 S. E. 888 (1934).9Jones v. Osage Oil & Refining Co., 280 Fed. 696 (C. C. A. 2d 1922); Radio
Electronic Tele ,ision Corp. v. Bartview Corp., 32 F. Supp. 431 (S. D. N. Y. 1940);
Aronson v. Bank of America N. T. & S. Ass'n., 9 Cal. (2d) 640, 72 P. (2d) 548 (1937) ;
Lacoe v. Wolfe, 133 Cal. App. 159, 153 P. (2d) 831 (1933) ; Gillies v. Robert E. Lee
Mining Co., 78- Mont. 402, 254 Pac. 422 (1927) ; Giffon v. American Safety Razor Corp.,
134 Misc. 140; 234 N. Y. Supp. 646 (Sup. Ct. 1929) ; Cincinnati Finance Co. v. Booth,
111 Ohio St. 361, 145 N. E. 543 (1924) ; Virginia Public Service Co. v. Steindler, 166
Va. 686, 187 S. E. 353 (1936). See also CHRIsTY, THE TRANSFER OF SrOCK (2d ed. 1940)
§ 396; Note (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 604.
10Seymour v. National Biscuit Co., 107 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 3d 1939); Clark v.
Wilson Lumber Co. v. McAllister, 101 F. (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 9th 1939) ; Lowry v.
Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (1848) ; Baxter v. Boston-Pacific Oil
Co., 81 Cal. App. 187, 253 Pac. 185 (1927). See also CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STocx
(2d ed. 1940) § 2; Dewey, The Transfer Agent's Dilemma; Conflicting Claims to Shares
of Stock (1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 553.
"1Tobias v. Wolverine Min. Co., 52 Idaho 576, 17 P. (2d) 338 (1932) ; Lynn v. General
Motors Corp., 252 App. Div. 837, 298 N. Y. Supp. 976 (4th Dep't 1938) ; Luitwieler v.
Luitwieler Pumping Engine Co., 118 Misc. 192, 192 N. Y. Supp. 891 (Sup. Ct. 1922);
Soltz v. Exhibitors' Service Co., 334 Pa. 211, 15 A. (2d) 899 (1939); Schmitt v.
Kulmar, 267 Pa. 1, 110 Atl. 169 (1920).
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requesting the transfer fails to produce the certificate or ,proof of its loss or
destruction. 12 The same is true of a certificate produced without proper
indorsement,'13 or where the transfer agent has refused to transfer on the
ground that the indorsement is not genuine but forged.14  Where a certificate
in the name of a decedent or an administrator, executor or trustee is presented
for transfer, the corporation may withhold the transfer until satisfactory evi-
dence of the propriety of the transfer is produced.' 5 But the corporation
ordinarily may not, as a ground for the refusal, pass on the legality of the
transaction by which the stock was transferred, or question the consideration
on which the transfer was based.' 6
When conflicting claims to the same stock are presented, the corporation is
bound to exercise good faith in determining to which one of the claimants
it will transfer the stock.1 7  Although the purpose of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act'8 is to make certificates of stock, as far as possible, the evidence
of ownership of the shares which they represent, facilitate their transfer,' 9
and protect bona fide purchasers of certificates genuinely endorsed in blank,20
it does not protect a purchaser with notice,2 1 nor a corporation which permits
a wrongful transfer with knowledge of the rights of third persons or without
exercising reasonable diligence to ascertain whether the transfer is authorized.22
Thus where notice is given of an adverse claim which might be lost or in-
juriously affected by the transfer, the transfer should be delayed until the
12Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369, 24 L. ed. 1047 (1878); Bertram v.
Exchange Trust Co., 4 F. Supp. 392 (D. C. Mass. 1933) ; Baxter v. Boston-Pacific Oil
Co., 81 Cal. App. 187, 253 Pac. 185 (1927); Fiala v. Conn. Electric Service Co., 114
Conn. 172, 158 Atl. 211 (1932) ; Muffat v. Detroit-Macomb Land Co., 252 Mich. 692, 234
N. W. 148 (1931) ; Suskin v. Hodges, 216 N. C. 333, 4 S. E. (2d) 891 (1939).
13Nicholls v. Reid, 109 Cal. 630, 42 Pac. 298 (1895).
14Barnard v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 110 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 7th 1940).
15Spellissy v. Cook & Bernheimer Co., 58 App. Div. 283, 68 N. Y. Supp. 995 (1st
Dep't 1901) ; Livezy v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 157 Pa. 75, 27 Atl. 379 (1893).
16Tobias v. Wolverine Min. Co., 52 Idaho 576, 17 P. (2d) 338 (1932) ; Casey v. Kastel,
237 N. Y. 305, 142 N. E. 671 (1924); Commonwealth v. Camp, 258 Pa. 548, 102 Atl.
205 (1917).
170'Neil v. Wolcott Mining Co., 174 Fed. 527 (C. C. A. 8th 1909); Cooper v. Spring
Valley Water Co., 171 Cal. 158, 153 Pac. 936 (1915).
's6 U. L. A.
1OLilley v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 194 So. 901 (La. App. 1940); Mills v.
Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A. (2d) 152 (1939).
20Hansen v. California Bank, 17 Cal. App. (2d) 80, 61 P. (2d) 794 (1937); People
ex rel. Nelson v. Depositors State Bank, 306 I1. App. 365, 28 N. E. (2d) 825 (1940) ;
U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Farroll, 296 Ill. App. 47, 15 N. E. (2d) 888 (1938) ; Peckinpaugh
v. H. W. Noble & Co., 238 Mich. 464, 213 N. W. 859 (1927); Turnbull v. Longacre
Bank, 249 N. Y. 159, 163 N. E. 135(1928) ; Iowa Securities Corp. v. Ridgewood Nat.
Bank, 106 Misc. 335, 175 N. Y. Supp. 776 (Sup. Ct. 1919). The court in Peckinpaugh
v. H. W. Noble & Co., supra at 471, stated: "Indorsement of and delivery by the owner
are distinct. Indorsement must appear; delivery by the owner need not be shown by a
good-faith purchaser from one having possession."21Escat v. Leaman, 181 So. 621 (La. App. 1938) ; De Boss v. Anthony, 300 Mass. 403,
15 N. E. (2d) 260 (1938) ; Edgerly v. First Nat. Bank, 292 Mass. 181, 197 N. E. 518
(1935) ; McAllister v. McAllister Coal Co., 120 N. J. Eq. 394, 184 Ati. 716 (1936).22Seymour v. Nat. Biscuit Co., 107 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 3d 1939); McAllister v.
McAllister Coal Co., 121 N. J. Eq. 249, 190 Atl. 53 (1936) ; West v. American T. & T. Co.,
54 Ohio App. 369, 7 N. E.(2d) 805 (1936); Soltz v. Exhibitors' Service Co., 334 Pa.
211, 5 A. (2d) 899 (1939).
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rights of the parties can be determined by an investigation or legal proceeding.23
"A corporation is not bound upon its peril to correctly interpret executory
contracts of shareholders or other legal relations existing between its share-
holders, and to award the title to the ultimate and true owner. There may be
a disputed claim made which requires judicial settlement between the
claimants before it should be recognized."' But if resort is not had to the
courts within a reasonable time then it becomes the duty of the corporation to
register the stock in the name of the first claimant,2 since a mere claim to the
stock does not justify the transfer agent in making an absolute refusal to
transfer the stock.
2 6
A California statute provides that when a certificate duly indorsed by the
record owner, is presented for transfer, the corporation may make the
transfer on its books unless the adverse claimant gives written notice of his
claim and within five days after giving such notice gives adequate security or
an indemnity bond, protecting the corporation and its transfer agent making
an absolute refusal to transfer the stock. The adverse claimant is then given
60 days after giving notice of his claim to start an action to establish his rights
in the certificate. If he fails to give the written notice, the security or bond, or
to commence the action, the corporation and transfer agent are exempt from
liability to the adverse claimant for making the transfer and issuing a new
certificate.
27
Since the corporation is charged with the duty to protect the interests of
23Lacoe v. Wolfe, 133 Cal. App. 162, 23 P. (2d) 831 (1933) ; Spangenberg v. Nesbitt,
22 Cal. App. 274, 134 Pac. 343 (1913) ; Bank of Norwood v. Ray, 21 Ga. App. 620, 94
S. E. 819 (1918) ; Gorham v. Massillon Iron & Steel Co., 284 Ill. 594, 120 N. E. 467
(1918) ; People v. Elgin Motor Corp., 209 Ill. App. 601 (1918) ; Corn. Exch. Nat. Bank
v. Kaiser, 160 Wis. 199, 151 N. W. 259 (1915).24Baxter v. Boston-Pacific Oil Co., 81 Cal. App. 187, 191, 253 Pac. 185 (1927). See
also Harris v. Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co., 75 Okla. 105, 182 Pac. 85 (1919) ; Livezey v.
Northern Pac. R. Co., 157 Pa. 75, 27 Atl. 379 (1893).
In § 239 of CHRISTY, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK (2d ed. 1940), the author suggests
that when a corporation is faced with conflicting claims to stock, it may maintain a bill
of interpleader to determine the rightful owner where there is reasonable doubt that the
corporation would not be safe in recognizing either claimant. The author points out,
however, that the difficulty with this remedy is that as a general rule if one of the
claimants is a non-resident of the state of corporate domicile or of the state in which the
transfer books are kept, a bill of interpleader can not be brought unless personal service
can be made on the non-resident in the state.2 5Baxter v. Boston-Pacific Oil Co., 81 Cal. App. 187, 253 Pac. 185 (1927) ; Spangen-
berg v. Nesbitt, 22 Cal. App. 274, 134 Pac. 343 (1913) ; Corn Exch. Nat Bank v. Kaiser,
160 Wis. 199, 151 N. W. 259 (1915).2 60'Neil v. Wolcott Mining Co., 174 Fed. 527 (C. C. A. 8th 1909) ; Powers v. Universal
Film Manufacturing Co., 162 App. Div. 806, 148 N. Y. Supp. 114 (Ist Dep't 1914).
In § 238 of CHRISTY, op. cit. supra note 24, the author states that although a transfer
agent is not justified in making an absolute refusal to transfer stock against which
a "stop order" by the record owner has been made, it may make a qualified refusal. After
the qualified refusal the agent would advise the person requesting the transfer that the
stock has been claimed by the record holder and that a reasonable time must be allowed
for investigating the claim. The agent must then notify the record holder of the re-
quested transfer in order to give him an opportunity to protect his claim. But if the
record holder does nothing to protect his claim and refuses or neglects to withdraw it,
the author implies that the transfer agent should then be permitted to transfer the stock
without liability in case the claim of the record holder is subsequently upheld.2 7 CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 328a.
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the owners of its shares of stock, it is liable to such owners for injury sus-
tained by reason of its failure to discharge such duty.28 At common law,
since the owner of stock was not deprived of ownership when his certificate
was lost or stolen, even though he had indorsed it in blank, the corporation
was liable to the owner in transferring such a certificate.2 9  Its liability in
such cases existed even though it acted in good faith and with due care.30
Since the passage of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act (namely Sections 1, 5,
6, and 7), 31 however, the bona fide purchaser of a stock certificate genuinely
indorsed in blank secures good title, even though the certificate had been con-
verted, lost, or stolen.8 2  With his indefeasible title, such a purchaser is en-
titled to demand a transfer of the stock upon the books of the corporation,
and in making the transfer, as required by the statute, the corporation wil
incur no liability to the former record owner even though it has actual
knowledge of the theft, or other wrongful act.38
2 8 Mackenzie v. Engelhard Co., 266 U. S. 131, 45 Sup. Ct. 68 (1924); Seymour v.
Nat. Biscuit Co., 107 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 3d 1939) ; Aronson v. Bank of America
N. T. & S, A., 9 Cal. (2d) 640, 72 P. (2d) 548 (1937) ; Leurey v. Bank of Baton Rouge,
131 La. 30, 58 So. 1022 (1912); Suskin v. Hodges, 216 N. C. 333, 4 S. E. (2d) 891
(1939) ; West v. American T. & T. Co., 54 Ohio App. 369, 7 N. E. (2d) 805 (1936).
The corporation has been held liable in permitting a transfer in the following illustrative
cases. Wrongful transfer by an agent: Clark v. Wilson Lumber Co. v. McAllister, 101
F. (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 9th 1939) ; Aronson v. Bank of America N. T. & S. A., 109 P.
(2d) 1001 (Cal. App. 1941) ; Vernon, G. & R. R. Co. v. Washington Civil Tp., 48 Ind.
App. 309, 95 N. E. 599 (1911); mistake between identical names: Holly Sugar Corp.
v. Wilson, 101 Colo. 511, 75 P. (2d) 149 (1937) ; transfer to vendee in ali invalid sale:
Citizens' St. Ry. Co. v. Robbins, 128 Ind. 449, 26 N. E. 116 (1891) ; and transfer on a
forged indorsement: Barnard v. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana, 110 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A.
7th 1940) ; Fiala v. Conn. Electric Service Co., 114 Conn. 172, 158 Atl. 211 (1932);
Coats v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 170 La. 871, 129 So. 513 (1930) ; Mohr v. J. C.
Penny Co., 270 N. Y. 606, 1 N. E. (2d) 352 (1936) ; Nat. Surety Co. v. Indemnity Ins.
Co., 237 App. Div. 485, 261 N. Y. Supp. 605 (1st Dep't 1933); Egan v. United Gas
Improvement Co., 319 Pa. 17, 178 Atl. 683 (1935). Under the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act the record owner does not lose title to even a bona fidq purchaser when his in-
dorsement has been forged: Atherton v. Mich. Guaranty Corp., 237 Misc. 133, 211 N. W.
83 (1926); Angus v. Cincinnati Morris Plan Bank, 56 Ohio App. 444, 10 N. E. (2d)
1019 (1937).
In the case of Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Bauer-Pogue & Co., 194 Ark. 1002, 110
S. W. (2d) 529 (1938), the court made the broad statement that a corporation in
cancelling and reissuing stock in the due course of business, was not required to investigate
as to whether such stock had been stolen and the indorsement forged. The decision,
however, was based upon estoppel because of the record owners' negligence.
20U. S. Gypsum Co. v. Faroll, 296 Ill. App. 47, 15 N. E. (2d) 888 (1938); Hannaks
v. Hammond Typewriter Co., 158 App. Div. 620, 143 N. Y. Supp. 939 (1st Dep't 1913) ;
Phillips v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 15 S. W. (2d) 550 (Comm. of App. Tex. Sec. B, 1929).
30 Telegraph Co. v. Davenport, 97 U. S. 369, 24 L. ed. 1047 (1878) ; Holly Sugar Corp.
v. Wilson, 101 Colo. 511, 75 P. (2d) 149 (1937); Mohr v. Penny Company, Inc., 242
App. Div. 385, 275 N. Y. Supp. 50 (1st Dep't 1934).
316 U. L. A.
32 Supra, note 20.
33Turmbull v. Longacre Bank, 249 N. Y. 159, 163 N. E. 135 (1928); Nicholson v.
Morgan, 119 Misc. 309, 196 N. Y. Supp. 147 (Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1922).
In the Turinbull case the court also held that until the corporation received notice that
an innocent purchaser had obtained good title against the original owner, and that such
purchaser claimed the right to the dividends, the corporation might continue to recognize
the exclusive right of the person registered on its books as the owner of shares to
receive dividends. Thus the purchaser was entitled to dividends payable on the securities
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The corporation is under no duty to protect the beneficial owners of its
stock when it is unaware of their existence.3 4 But where the corporation has
actual or constructive knowledge that its stock is held in trust, it is bound to
exercise reasonable care and diligence in protecting the interest of the bene-
ficial owner and is liable for any loss suffered by knowingly or negligently per-
mitting the trustee to make an unauthorized transfer on its books in violation
of the trust.35 It is its duty to make a reasonable inquiry into the propriety
of the transfer, and, to protect itself, the corporation has the right to refuse
a transfer of such stock until the terms of the trust are submitted for its
scrutiny.36 But upon a showing that the inquiry, if made, would not have
disclosed the breach of trust, liability will be avoided ;37 nor will the corpora-
tion be liable, if it acts in good faith, for failure to inquire into the purposes
for which a transfer is made by one in whose name title to the shares stands
and who has a complete power of disposition over them, although it knows
that he holds them in a fiduciary capacity.38 The imposition of this duty of
inquiry has been severely criticized as imposing a heavy burden on corpora-
tions and a serious obstruction to the administration of trusts.39 Section 3
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act,40 is an attempt to mitigate the harshness of
the imposition of such duty. This section provides that the corporation or
its transfer agent is not bound to inquire whether the fiduciary is committing
a breach of his duties in making the transfer or to see to the performance
of a fiduciary obligation. Under this section the corporation is only liable
when the registration is made with actual knowledge that fiduciary is com-
mitting a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in making the transfer, or with
knowledge of such facts that the registering of the transfer amounts to bad
faith.4 ' Another method of avoiding this duty of inquiry is afforded by
after the answer containing its counterclaim was served on the corporation which issued
the certificates.34Leurey v. Bank of Baton Rouge, 131 La. 30, 58 St. 1022 (1912) ; Weaver v. Barden,
49 N. Y. 286 (1872) ; Smith v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 91 Tenn. 221, 18 S. W. 546 (1892).
35Seymour v. Nat. Biscuit Co., 107 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 3d 1939); Geyser-Marior
Gold-Min. Co. v. Stark, 106 Fed. 558 (C. C. A. 8th 1901) ; First Nat. Bank v. Pittsburgh,
F. W. & C. Ry. Co., 31 F. Supp. 381 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Loring v. Salisbury Mills, 125
Mass. 138 (1878). See also West v. American T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223, 61 Sup. Ct.
179 (1940) which held the corporation liable to a remainderman where it had transferred
stock to the life tenant without limitation.3 6Bayard v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank, 52 Pa. 232 (1866).37Hughes v. D. & M. Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 86 Md. 418, 38 Atl. 936 (1897) ; Peck
v. Providence Gas Co., 17 R. I. 275, 21 Atl. 543 (1891).
sHughes v. D. & M. Nat. Bank of Baltimore, 86 Md. 418, 38 Atl. 936 (1897).39See CHRISTY, op. cit. supra note 24, §§ 2, 3; Scott, Participation in a Breach of Triest,
(1921) 34 tARv. L. REv. 454, at pages 465, 481; Leg. Doc. (1937) No. 65 (i) of the New
York Law Revision Commission.
409 U. L. A.
41Seymour v. Nat. Biscuit Co., 107 F. (2d) 58 (C. C. A. 3d 1939) ; First Nat. Bank
v. Pittsburgh F. W. & C. Ry. Co., 31 F. Supp. 381 (D. C. Pa. 1940).
The Commissioners' Note states that this section applies only when the stock is
registered in the name of the fiduciary and has no applicability where the security is
registered in the name of the principal, or where it is registered in the name of a
decedent and the executor or administrator desires to transfer it into his own name or
the name of a third person. Similar provisions have been enacted in California, CAL.
Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937) §§ 328b, 328e; Delaware, DEL. Rlv. CoDE (1935) §§ 3859,
4402; Kentucky, Ky. STAT. ANN. REV. (Baldwin, 1936) § 4707; Massachusetts, MASS.
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Section 9 of the Uniform Trusts Act, 42 which permits a trustee to hold
corporate stock in the name of a nominee if the nominee signs and delivers
to the trustee a statement of such holding, the books of the trustee and all
reports show these facts, the nominee has no access to the stock certificate and
has indorsed it in blank before returning it to the trustee. This scheme has
been criticized on the ground that registration in the name of a nominee
destroys notice to everyone of the fiduciary relationship and thus facilitates
frauds upon beneficiaries.43  But as already indicated, the purpose of both
statutory provisions is merely to relieve the corporation from its common law
obligation to be, at its peril, a "watch-dog" of the beneficiaries' interests.
The decision in the Leff case is logically and necessarily just. If the corpora-
tion is to be liable in certain cases even if it transfers stock in good faith and
without knowledge that the transfer is for some reason wrongful, then it
should not be compelled, in a mandamus proceeding, to transfer stock when it
has actual knowledge of a substantial adverse claim to the stock and of its
probable liability for making the demanded transfer under such circumstances.
Edward R. Moran
Evidence: Aggregate larceny: Single and successive larcenies and the
single impulse rule: Admissibility of evidence of ,other criminal acts of
the defendant.-The New York Court of Appeals recently had before it the
question whether a series of petit larcenies from the same owner and from
the same place, in a series of acts, each committed with a single intent and
design as a part of a common scheme, will constitute a single grand larceny
regardless of the time elapsing between the various takings. Answering the
question in the affirmative, People v. Cox, 286 N. Y. 137, 36 N. E. (2d)
84 (1941) follows the rule announced in twenty-four of the states and in
England.1
ANN. LAws (1933) c. 203, § 21; New York, N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 359i-359k. See
note (1932) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 604; and Ohio, OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) §
8623-33. In § 230 of CHRISTY, op. cit. supra note 24, the author states that the Ohio
statute is the broadest and best from the point of view of a transfer agent.
429 U. L. A. The Commissioners' Note states that the purpose of this section is to
enable the trustee to sell stock easily, and to avoid the requirements of stock exchanges
that when stock is held in the name of a fiduciary elaborate proof of the power of the
fiduciary to sell must be given.43Chapter House Circle v. Hartford Nat. Bank, 121 Conn. 558, 186 Atl. 543 (1936);
Matter of Harris, 169 Misc. 943, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 508 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; In re Guthrie's
Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 182 Atl. 248 (1936). But see Meehan v. North Adams Say. Bank,
302 Mass. 357, 19 X. E. (2d) 299 (1939) in which the bona fide pledgee for value of stock
represented by "street certificates" was protected.'
1United States: Willis v. State, 134 Ala. 429, 450-451, 33 So. 226, 233-234 (1926)
(embezzlement); Carl v. State, 125 Ala. 89, 104-105, 28 So. 505, 509-510 (1900) (lar-
ceny) ; People v. Fleming, 220 Cal. 601, 611, 32 P. (2d) 593, 596 (1934) (embezzle-
ment) ; People v. Miles, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 373, 380, 99 P. (2d) 551, 554 (1940) ; Craig
v. State, 95 Fla. 374, 379, 116 So. 272, 273, 274 (1928) (embezzlement); Norman
v. State, 44 Ga. App. 92, 97, 160 S. E. 522, 524 (1931) (embezzlement); Camp v.
State, 31 Ga. App. 737, 738, 122 S. E. 249, 250 (1924) (embezzlement); State v.
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This case was one of a series brought against a number of employees of
the Independent Subway System of the City of New York who had engaged
for years in stealing nickel fares in the station turnstiles. Defendant Cox, a
maintainer, was convicted of two crimes, grand larceny in the first degree
and grand larceny in the second degree, each involving action in concert
with a particular agent. To accomplish the theft, joint action was required by
the station agent and the defendant maintainer. Both would decide first upon
the number of fares to be taken. On each occasion defendant took 500 or
600 fares, amounting to $25 or $30. Defendant maintainer would then turn
back the turnstile register which automatically recorded the nickels deposited,
so as to have it appear fewer passengers had gone through the turnstile. The
station agent would then make his report agree with the amount on the
register as set by the maintainer, and the difference would be divided between
them.
The People could have indicted the defendant for each of his separate
crimes,2 but conviction would then be for petit larceny. The theory of the
district attorney, however, was:
"We are going to ask you to convict this man of grand larceny. This
Peters, 43 Idaho 564, 571, 572, 253 Pac. 842, 844 (1927) (embezzlement); State v.
Dawe, 31 Idaho 798, 803-804, 177 Pac. 393, 395-396 (1918) (embezzlement) ; People
v. Heilemann, 362 Ill. 322, 333, 199 N. E. 792 (1935) (embezzlement) ; Woods v.
People, 222 Ill. 293, 299-302, 78 N. E. 607, 608-609 (1906) (larceny) ; Peters v. State,
191 Ind. 130, 132, 132 N. E. 256 (1921) (receiving) ; State v. Hall, 111 Kan. 458, 459,
207 Pac. 773, 774 (1922) (larceny); Weaver v. Commonwealth, 27 Ky. L. R. 743,
744-745, 86 S. W. 551, 552 (1905) (larceny) ; Dodson v. State, 130 Miss. 137, 142-143,
93 So. 579, 580 (1922 (larceny); State v. Shour, 196 Mo. 202, 214-215, 95 S. W. 405,
408-409 (1906) (embezzlement); State v. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482, 489-491, 11 S. W. 977,
978-979 (1889) (embezzlement) ; State v. Kurth, 105 Mont. 260, 262-263, 12 P. (2d)
687, 688 (1937) (embezzlement) ; Ex parte, Jones, 46 Mont. 122, 125-127, 126 Pac. 929,
930-931 (1912) (larceny) ; Bolln v. State, 51 Neb. 581, 594,- 71 N. W. 444, 448 (1897)
(embezzlement) ; State v. Mandich, 24 Nev. 336, 342, 54 Pac. 516, 518 (1898) (larceny)
State v. Bickford, 28 N. D. 36, 67-69, 147 N. W. 407, 417-418 (1913) (embezzlement)
Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 496, 513 (1869) (embezzlement) ; Young v. State, 44 Ohio
App. 1, 3-4, 184 N. E. 24, 25 (1932) (embezzlement) ; Moore v. State, 58 Okla. Cr.
122, 130-134, 50 P. (2d) 746, 750-752 (1935) (embezzlement); Fulkerson v. State, 17
Okla. Crim. 103, 129-131, 189 Pac. 1092, 1101 (1920) (embezzlement) ; State v. Rein-
hart, 26 Ore. 466, 481-482, 38 Pac. 822, 826-827 (1895) (embezzlement); Common-
wealth v. Cook, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 117 (1930) (embezzlement) ; Wilson v. State, 70
Tex. Crim. Rep. 631, 633, 158 S. W. 284 (1913) (larceny); Cody v. State, 31 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 183, 184-185, 20 S. W. 398, 398-399 (1892) (larceny); State v. Gibson, 37
Utah 330, 332-333, 108 Pac. 349, 349-350 (1910) (embezzlement); West v. Common-
wealth, 125 Va. 747, 754, 99 S. E. 654, 656 (1919) (larceny); State v. Linden, 171
Wash. 92, 102-103, 17 P. (2d) 635, 639 (1932) (embezzlement) ; State v. Dix, 33 Wash.
405, 411, 74 Pac. 570, 571-572 (1903) (embezzlement) ; State v. Wetzel, 75 W. Va. 7,
16-19, 83 S. E. 68, 72-73 (1914) (embezzlement); State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146,
157-158, 52 S. E. 30, 35 (1905) (embezzlement) :
England: Regina v. Bleasdale, 2 Carr. & K. 765 (1848) (larceny) ; Regina v. Firth,
11 Cox Cr. Cas. 234 (1869) (larceny) ; Regina v. Henwood, 22 L, T. R. 486 (1870)
(larceny) ; Regina v. Shephers, 37 L. J. 45, 11 Cox Cr. Cas. 110 (1869) (larceny).
See also 2 BISHOP'S CRIMIN. LAW (9th ed. 1923) 673; 2 WHARToN's CRIMINAL.
LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 1171, pp. 1489-1491; 36 Corpus Juris 798; Kadanoff, Separate
Acts as a Sinqle Crime, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 1, 1934, 1. 518,2See People v. Bord, 243 N. Y. 595, 596, 154 N. E. 620 (1926) ; State v. Linden, 171
Wash. 92, 102, 17 P. (2d) 635, 639 (1932).
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is what he is charged with here, because his takings, although small on
each occasion, accumulated and became substantial and since those takings
were all pursuant to one impulse, the impulse to steal as much as he
could, the conclusion will be irresistible that he intended to commit and
did commit a grand larceny."13
The trial judge, Justice Jacob Gould Schurman, Jr., of the Court of General
Sessions of the County of New York, accepted the district attorney's theory,
4
but charged that the several takings could not be aggregated if not motivated
by a single impulse or part of a common scheme, and, as requested by counsel
for the defense, charged that the jury should acquit if it found that the de-
fendant had committed separate larcenies as the result of different impulses.5
The theory of the court and the district attorney seems sound from a legal
point of view; but the difficulty is that there was then and there is now no
statutory provision6 authorizing a district attorney to aggregate petit thefts
and prosecute for grand larceny. In 1939 a bill 7 was presented to the state
legislature specifically sanctioning a prosecution for a continuing grand lar-
ceny. Under this bill grand larceny might be established by proof "either
of a single taking or appropriation or a series of takings or appropriations over
a period of time," provided that the several takings "were motivated by either
a single intent, impulse or desire or constituted parts of a common scheme or
plan." But this proposed bill was not reported out of committee by either
chamber of the legislature.
It is not intended here to dispute the desirability of such a rule as that
laid down in the Cox case, although it might seem that the court should
have left this extension of the law to the legislature.8 The writer recognizes
on the other hand that if a court waits until legislation is passed, many crimi-
nals may go unpunished. Also, one can never be sure what caused the legis-
lature not to pass the proposed bill in 1939. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter re-
cently said in respect of Congress' failure to change the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure when proposed modifications were reported to it, "Having
due regard to the mechanics of legislation and practical conditions surround-
3 Opening to Jury, see Record on Appeal, fol. 86.4 Record on Appeal, fols. 2041-2045, 2079.
5 Record on Appeal, fol. 2090: People v. Gutterson, 244 N. Y. 243, 155 N. E. 113
(1926) ; People v. Robertson, 201 App. Div. 869, 193 N. Y. Supp. 947 (3d Dep't 1922),
aff'd, 253 N. Y. 548, 139 N4 E. 730 (1922) ; cf. Scarver v. State, 53 Miss. 407 (1876) ;
Camp v. State, 7 Okla. Cr. 531, 124 Pac. 331 (1912); Edelhoff v. State, 5 Wyo. 19,
36 Pac. 627 (1894) ; 2 CYCLOPEDIA CiRmINAL LAW (1923) § 794, p. 1319.
ON. Y. PEND. LAw §§ 1290, 1294, 1298.
7N. Y. SEN. Pp. 1263, Int. 1145; N. Y. AssEm. PR. 1691, Int. 1551 (March 1, 1939)
see also 63 REPORT OF THE N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N (1940) 341; 62 REPORT OF THE
N. Y. STATE BAR Ass'N (1939) 339-340; Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, Committee on Criminal Courts, Law and Procedure, Bulletin 5, pp. 245-247
(March 30, 1939); Kadanoff, Separate Acts as a Single Crime, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 1,
1934, p. 518.
SPeople v. Tompkins, 186 N. Y. 413, 416, 79 N. E. 326 (1906); see also Manhat-
tan Properties v. Irving Trust Company, 291 U. S. 320, 54 Sup. Ct. 385 (1934),
where after the decision the Act of June 7, 1934, amended section 63(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and made a limited claim for future rents thereafter provable.
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ing the business of Congress . . . , to draw any inference of tacit approval
from non-action by Congress is to appeal to unreality."9
The decision in the Cox case was made under section 275 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure which provides that where several takings are used as
the basis of a prosecution for grand larceny the several takings must together
spell out "the act constituting the crime." This would not seem to prevent a
conviction of a defendant for takings from different owners, i.e., in terms of
the Cox case, X dollars from I.R.T., Y dollars from B.M.T., and Z dollars
from the Independent Subway System.'0
Another aspect of the Cox case arises from the fact that the statute of
limitations for petit larceny is only two years," whereas the statute for grand
larceny is five years.12 Defendant Cox was convicted only for takings within
the two year period, viz. 1937 to 1939. But other takings outside the two year
period were shown to establish the common plan and scheme of the defen-
dant. This seems right.13
If petit larcenies are to be aggregated to make grand larceny, it appears
that the district attorney should' be required to use takings only within the
petit larceny statutory period of two years. But theoretically, since the prose-
cution is for grand larceny why cannot takings outside the two years but
within the five be used as a basis of prosecution? Will the Cox case be so
extended?
The present decision is likely to result in some confusion when a witness
is called and refuses to answer on the ground of "self-incrimination" where
the statutory period has run as to petit larceny but4 has not run for an ag-
gregated grand larceny.' 4 The burden rests on the interrogator to prove
affirmatively that the statutes have run, and that no suits begun within the
statutory period are pending. To show a mere elapse of sufficient time to bar
prosecution if the party charged resided in the state during such time is not
enough; the prosecution must show he was so resident.' 5
It would seem clear that a defendant would be faced with "double jeopardy"
if he were acquitted for the aggregated larceny, but was subsequently indicted
for any single taking within the period designated. 16
9Sibbach v. Wilson Co., 312 U. S. 1, 61 Sup. Ct. 422, 428 (1941).
IoCf. People v. Robertson, 201 App. Div. 869, 193 N. Y. Supp. 947 (3d Dep't 1922),
aff'd, 235 N. Y. 548, 139 N. E. 730 (1922).
"IN. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 142.
12N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1299.
'
3People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286 (1901) ; People v. Gerks, '243 N.
Y. 166, 153 N. E. 36 (1936) ; "People v. Duffy, 212 N. Y. 57, 105 N. E. 839 (1914);
cf. People v. Grutz, 212 N. Y. 72, 105 N. E. 843 (1914).
14N. Y. CoxsT. Art. I, § 6; see Close v. Olney, 1 Denio (N, Y.) 319 (1845) ; Meyer
v. Mayo, 173 App. Div. 199, 159 N. Y. Supp. 405 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd; 179 App. Div.
886, 165 N. Y. Supp. 1099, 166 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1st Dep't 1917) ; People v. Steiger, 154
Misc. 538, 277 N. Y. Supp. 602 (General Sessions 1935).
15Henry v. Bank of Salina, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 593, 1 N. Y. 83 (1847) ; People v. Rock-
ala, 339 Ill. 474, 171 N. E. 559 (1930).
16N. Y. CoNsT. Art. I, § 6 ;n N. Y. PEN. LAW § 1938; State v. Linden, 171 Wash. 92,
102-103, 17 P. (2d) 635, 639 (1932) ; People v. Farson, 244 N. Y. 413, 419, 155 N. E.
724 (1927). Cf. People v. Synder, 241 N. Y. 71, 148 N. E. 796 (1928), where defen-
dant was convicted and sentenced for petit larceny and thereafter for burglary in the
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The seventh count of the indictment in the instant case charged conspiracy.
"While the court under each of the counts limited the taking to a single sub-
way station, with a single confederate, evidence of other takings by the de-
fendant, acting in concert with other agents was proper." 7 Such evidence
would be proper to establish the conspiracy. At the close of the state's case,
however, this conspiracy count was dropped.'$ Testimony of seven witnesses
was allowed to go to the jury though challenged. If admitted solely on the
conspiracy theory it would seem prejudicial to the defendant.' 9 People v.
Molineux"° states the New York rule that evidence tending to prove a defen-
dant guilty of any' crime not alleged in the indictment is inadmissible for any
purpose except when it tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) ab-
sence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the
commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one
tends to establish the other; (5) the identity of the person charged with the
commission of the crime on trial.
To bring the case within the exception to the general rule which excludes
other crimes, there must be some evidence of a general plan or system between
the offense on trial and the one sought to be introduced. justice Schurman
in the trial court adequately safeguarded the defendant, however, when he
charged:
"If found to be corroborated to the extent and in the manner discussed,
the jury may also consider the evidence of other similar transactions
given by all witnesses, . . . [naming them], but only as bearing on the
criminal intent charged by the People to the defendant Cox in his
alleged takings, and the existence or non-existence of a single and sus-
tained criminal impulse, and the existence of non-existence of a general
scheme or plan."2
Although the court's decision in the principal case seems justifiable, the
legislature would do well to write into a specific statute the circumstances un-
der which a person could be indicted and convicted, and to state in no un-
certain terms what the statute of limitations is to be., Roger H. Williams*
Executors and Administrators: Contingent claim: Reserve for payment.
-In In re Reilly's Will, 175 Misc. 597, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 213 (Surr. Ct.
1941),, claimant was the owner by assignment of two bonds in the sum of
third degree for the same acts, the court holding it within the legislative power to make
separate acts separate crimes and separately punishable and not in contravention of the
double jeopardy clause of the New York constitution( See also N. Y. PEN. LA.W § 406.
17People v. Cox, 286 N. Y. 137, 144, 36 N. E. (2d) 84 (1941). Italics added.
'sRecord on Appeal, fols. 1398, 1787, 1798.
19United States v. Downing, 51 F. (2d) 1030, 1031 (C. C. A. 2d 1931); 9 BROOLYN
L. Rxv. 263, 271.20See cases cited note 13.21Record on Appeal, fols. 2074-2075. Italics added.
*Third-year student, not member of QUARTERLY staff.
IThis case is also noted in (1941) 54 HA~v. L. REv. 1067.
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$325,000, executed by the decedent and secured by a mortgage. The ap-
praised value of the mortgaged property at the death of the decedent was
$333,000. Before his death, the decedent conveyed the premises; the mortgage
has been reduced to $280,000. The estate of the decedent consisted of realty,
specifically devised, worth $666,000, and of personal property insufficient to
pay the expenses of administration and accrued debts. Having filed a con-
tingent claim under Section 207 of the N. Y. Surrogate's Court Act, the
claimant now seeks to have established a reserve of $280,000, the amount of
unpaid debt, by a sale of sufficient realty to provide for any possible future
deficiency. Held: The request is denied. The grounds of the decision were
that realty is not an asset in the hands of the executor, and that the establish-
ment of a reserve for a contingent claim is not one of the specifically enumerated
purposes under Section 234 of the N. Y. Surrogate's Court Act for which real
property may be sold.
Under Section 207, the judicial problem has been: How can the executor
make the greatest possible distribution of the assets of the estate to the
legatees and devisees consistent with giving full protection to the creditors
of the decedent who hold contingent claims ?"a In Matter of Burrows, the
decedent owned premises subject to a $2,000 bond secured by a mortgage;
the personal assets in the estate were sufficient to pay the debt. The claimant
under the bond asked that a reserve be established to meet the contingency.
On finding that the value of the mortgaged property was greater than the
debt due, the Surrogate denied the request.2 The Appellate Division unan-
imously affirmed this denial. 3 The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered
a reserve to be created. 4 In effect, this decision seems to require the repre-
sentative to set aside a reserve of 100% of the debt pending a future fore-
closure.5 To apply this principle to all contingent claims would be a hardship,
for it would delay and complicate the administration of decedent estates. In
some instances, no reserve would be required because the collateral would be
adequate to pay the debt at maturity.6
In denying the request in the principal case, the Surrogate attempted to dis-
tinguish between the liability of personalty and realty in the creation of a
reserve fund. He did not regard realty an "asset" in the hands of the
executors. On that basis, he limited the operation of the principle of the
Burrows case to those instances where there are personal assets of the decedent
from which to establish the reserve.
Under this section, prior to the Burrows case, the courts dealt mainly with
two problems: (1) whether an executor could ignore a contingent claim of
which he had knowledge, 7 and (2) the extent of the reservation to be made.8
It is to the latter of these that we turn our attention.
1
=Recommendations to Assembly No. 673, Int. 643, amendment to Sec. 207 (1941),
reprinted in practice manuals.
Matter of Burrows, 170 Misc. 78, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 913 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
SMatter of Burrows, 258 App. Div. 906, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 881 (2d Dep't 1939).4Matter of Burrows, 283 N. Y. 540, 29 N. E. (2d) 77 (1940).8Reconmmendations to Assembly No. 673, Int. 643, amendment to Sec. 207 (1941), re-
printed in practice manuals; Foley, Inheritance Law Changes, (June, 1941) N. Y. BAR
Ass'N BULL. 93, 95.6Matter of Quintana, 158 Misc. 701, 286 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
IThe representative can be later surcharged if he has knowledge of a contingent claim
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The Surrogate held that a contingent claim is not a debt within the meaning
of the term employed in the law of decedent estates. It is submitted that the
Surrogate failed to recognize the real character of this contingent claim. The
contingent debt represented an original liability of the decedent, evidenced by
two bonds with the mortgage security as collateral to the debt. Before the
mortgage moratorium,9 the claimant could have sued the decedent during his
lifetime on the bonds without resorting to foreclosure upon the mortgaged
realty. His death made the claims contingent; since the bond was secured
by a mortgage on realty, after his death the creditor had to resort first to the
mortgaged property to satisfy his debt.'0
Of course, the assets of the estate in the hands of the legatees or devises
are liable for any deficiency that may result from a sale of the property for
less than the face value of the bond." The debt of the decedent is defeated
only by the contingency of a full recovery of the value of the bond upon the
sale of the real property. Under the Bankruptcy Act,12 a contingent claim
is regarded as a provable debt. It would seem that to deny that the decedent's
liability on two original bonds, made contingent by death, is a debt is not a
realistic approach.
The case of the petitioner is strengthened by the fact that the will granted
and makes a distribution without citing claimant: Matter of Riordan, 251 App. Div. 305,
296 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1st Dep't 1937) ; Matter of Goldwitz, 171 Misc. 198, 12 N. Y. S.
(2d) 418 (Surr. Ct. 1939), reversed, 258 App. Div. 62, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 735 (2d Dep't
1939), appeal dimiissed, 283 N. Y. 680, 28 N. Y. (2d) 405 (1940) ; Matter of Frommelt,
154 Misc. 81, 276 N. Y. Supp. 558 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; Matter of Shulz, 152 Misc. 601, 273
N. Y. Supp. 882 (Surr. Ct. 1934) ; Matter of Shafran, 143 Misc. 754, 257 N. Y. Supp.
234 (Surr. Ct. 1932). Regardless of knowledge of the representative, other courts require
affirmative action on the part of the contingent claimant; his remedy after distribution
is against the legatees or devisees under Art. 7 of the Decedent Estates Law, and not
against the executor or administrator: Matter of Goldwitz, 258 App. Div. 62, 15 N. Y. S.
(2d) 735 (2d Dep't 1939); Matter of Brenner, 171 Misc. 627, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 483
(Surr. Ct. 1939), affd, 258 App. Div. 77, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 136 (2d Dep't 1939) ; Matter
of Cronin, 162 Misc. 370, 294 N. Y. Supp. 763 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; Matter of Baldwin, 157
Misc. 538, 284 N. Y. Supp. 761 (Surr. Ct. 1935) (containing a good history of Section
207 at p. 545) ; Matter of Homer, 149 Misc. 695, 268 N. Y. Supp. 74 (Surr. Ct. 1933).8 Matter of Quintana, 158 Misc. 701, 286 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; Matter of
Concklin, 150 Misc. 53, 268 N. Y. Supp. 348 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; Matter of McIntyre, 144
Misc. 177, 259 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Surr. Ct. 1932) ; Matter of Weissman, 140 Misc. 360,
250 N. Y. Supp. 500 (Surr. Ct. 1931); Matter of Littleton, 129 Misc. 845, 223 N. Y.
Supp. 470 (Surr. Ct. 1927) (also declares first and third paragraphs of the amendment of
1921 unconstitutional).9 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1083 (a), 1083 (b).
'ON. Y. DEc. EST. LAW § 250; Matter of McLaren, 172 Misc. 205, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 905
(Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Matter of Perkins, 122 Misc. 593, 204 N. Y. Supp. 725 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ;
Matter of Weissman, 140 Misc. 360, 250 N. Y. Supp. 500 (Surr. Ct., 1931) ; Hauselt v.
Patterson, 124 N. Y. 349, 26 N. E. 937 (1891).
"IN. Y. DEc. EST. LAW Art. 7; Matter of Brenner, 171 Misc. 627, 13 N. Y. S. (2d)
483 (Surr. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 258 App. Div. 77, 15 N. Y. S. (2d) 136 (Ist Dep't 1939) ;
Matter of Concklin, 150 Misc. 53, 268 N. Y. Supp. 348 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of
Horner, 149 Misc. 695, 268 N. Y. Supp. 74 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
1252 STAT. 873 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 103 (a) (8) (1940) ; Maynard v. Elliott, 283
U. S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. 390 (1931). "A creditor is defined by the uniform fraudulent
conveyance act as a person having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated
or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." 3 MIcH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 13392,
Iden v. Huber, 259 Mich. 3, 6, 242 N. W. 818 (1932).
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a discretionary power of sale over specifically devised real property to his
executors "for any lawful purpose." The executors would seem to have had
ample authority to sell the property in order to establish a reserve to secure
this contingent claim despite the doubt of the Surrogate. The establishment
of such a reserve under the enumerated purposes for which real property could
be sold, may well have been found under the "any other purposes necessary"
provision of Section 234 (7) of the N. Y. Surrogate's Court Act.13
In New York, realty has been subject to sale for debts of the estate since
1786.14 The amendment to Section 207 to provide protection for contingent
claimants was made in 1921. The Decedent Estate Law of 1930 tended
further to abolish the distinction between realty and personalty.15
The court insists that the sale of the realty in the instant case to provide
additional security for a contingent claimant who has only a $280,000 bond
while the property securing it is valued at $333,000 would inflict grave and
irreparable injury on the devisees. The maximum loan allowed by law on
this property for investment of trust funds would only be $222,000. Under
the policy of the Home Owners Loan Corporation, at 80% of the appraised
value, the maximum loan would only be $266,400.16 The very object of the
personal bond was to assure the mortgagee adequate protection in the event
of a deficiency on a foreclosure sale. The postponement of an action upon the
bond in the moratorium act, which limits the rights to foreclose, makes it still
more important to protect the mortgagee. That the property is at present
worth more than the sum due on the bond should not alter the right of the
contingent claimant as against the legatees and devisees who are mere donees,
some of whom even failed to co-operate in making it possible for the executors
to pay the liquidated debts and taxes. Does their protection justify shifting
to the assignee of the bond the risk of the property decreasing in value?
Some courts have refused to set aside a reserve where the collateral was ade-
quate at the time of distribution; if a deficiency later arise, the claimant is left
to proceed against the distributees or legatees under Article 7 of the Decedent
Estate Law."7 If the distribution is made, the distributees may squander
their share so that a judgment, thereafter obtained, could not be collected.'5
In determining the reserve, an appraisal of the collateral should take into con-
sideration what would be a sufficient margin of safety so there would be no
danger that the security would later prove insufficient.19
133 WARaRN's HEATON ON SURROGATES' COURTS (6th ed. 1941) § 259, f1 8, p. 378.
14N. Y. SuRR. CT. AcT § 234; Matter of Cunniff's Estate, 272 N. Y. 89, 94, 4 N. E.
(2d) 946 (1936).
15N. Y. DEc. EsT. LAw § 81.
1653 STAT. 1403 (1939), 12 U. S. C. § 1463 (d) (1940).
17Matter of Quintana, 158 Misc. 701, 286 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; Matter
of Concklin, 150 Misc. 53, ?68 N. Y. Supp. 348 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; cf. Matter of McIntyre,
144 Misc. 177, 259 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Surr. Ct. 1932) at page 180, "The fact that the
claimants may have a remedy over against the legatees does not deprive them of the right
to have a reservation made, if their claims are properly provable against the decedent's
estate."
183 WARREN'S HEATON, op. cit. supra note 13, § 260, 1i 6 (c), p. 540.
19Matter of Quintana, 158 Misc. 70, 286 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Surr. Ct. 1936); N. Y.
Life Ins. Co. v. Guttag, 265 N. Y. 292, 192 N. E. 481 (1934). In cases dealing with
waste of mortgaged premises, a great many courts of equity "hold it is not necessary
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To obviate the hardship of the Burrows case, where a reserve was created
equal to the sum of the debt, the legislature of 1941 amended Section 207 on
recommendation of the Executive Committee of the Surrogate's Association.2 0
By the amendment, the Surrogate is authorized judically to determine whether
a reserve is necessary, and, if it is, to reserve estate assets sufficient to pay any
sum which may be required upon liquidation of the claim.21 The use of the
term "estate assets" seems clearly to indicate realty although realty may not
be assets in the hands of the executors until the need for the statutory reserve
is determined.
22
Ronald E. Colenuan
Labor law: Strikes: Legality of strike against use of machinery.-In
Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), an opera
company had been organized to present grand opera throughout the United
States. To make the tours profitable, the vocal stars and choruses sang
to the accompaniment not of an orchestra but of recorded music, to which the
singers' voices were synchronized. The Musicians' Union, already suffering
from the inroads which recorded music had made upon the employment of
orchestral performers,' saw in this a new threat. Accordingly, the union called
upon an affiliated organization, the Stagehands' Union, to refuse to work for
the opera company. A strike was called. At the suit of the opera company,
to wait until the margin of safety is low, but that they will interfere whenever there
is the slightest danger that the security will prove insufficient." Note to Eisenberg v.
Javas, 134 Atl. 769 (N. J.), 48 A. L. R. 1155, 1158 (1926) ; Anderson v. Englehart, 18
Wyo. 409, 423, 108 Pac. 977, 979 (1910).
20L. 1941, c. 86, amendment to N. Y. SuRR. CT. Acr § 207; Foley, Inheritalwe Law
Changes, (June, 1941) N. Y. BAR Ass'N BULL. 93, 95; (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 950.
2 1Surogates had followed this practice before the Burrows case: Matter of Goldwitz,
171 Misc. 198, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 418 (1939), reversed on other grounds, 258 App. Div. 62,
15 N. Y. S. (2d) 735 (2d Dep't 1939) ; Matter of Reid, 165 Misc. 207, 300 N. Y. Supp.
451 (Surr. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 850, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 360 (1st Dep't 1938) ;
Matter of Quintana, 158 Misc. 701, 286 N. Y. Supp. 418 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of
Concklin, 150 Misc. 53, 268 N. Y. Supp. 348 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; Matter of McIntyre, 144
Misc. 177, 259 N. Y. Supp. 73 (Surr. Ct. 1932) ; Matter of Littleton, 129 Misc. 845, 223
N. Y. Supp. 470 (Surr. Ct. 1927).2 2 Reserves under See. 207 have been established for: Matter of Vaughan, 156 Misc.
577, 282 N. Y. Supp. 214 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 248 App. Div. 730, 289 N. Y. Supp. 825
(2d Dep't 1935) (installments on a land purchase contract); Matter of Babcock, 147
Misc. 900, 265 N. Y. Supp. 470 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 239 App. Div. 884, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 474 (1st Dep't 1933), app. denied, 263 N. Y. 665, 189 N. E. 747 (1933) (future
alimony); Matter of Burridge, 146 Misc. 527, 262 N. Y. Supp. 378 (Surr. Ct. 1933)
(contract monthly payments for life) ; Matter of Weissman, 140 Misc. 360, 250 N. Y.
Supp. 500 (Surr. Ct. 1931) (mortgage bond).
Not applied in: Matter of Riordan, 251 App. Div. 305, 296 N. Y. Supp. 337 (1st
Dep't 1937) ; Matter of McLaren, 172 Misc. 205, 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 905 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ;
Matter of Wood, 171 Misc. 542, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 816 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Matter of
Baldwin, 157 Misc. 538, 284 N. Y. Supp. 761 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; Matter of Lust, 140 Misc.
600, 251 N. Y. Supp. 556 (Surr. Ct. 1931) ; Matter of Taubin, 128 Misc. 515, 219 N. Y.
Supp. 494 (Surr. Ct. 1926).
'See Brief for Respondents, pp. 7-8.
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which had been forced to cease business, an injunction granted below was
sustained.2
The ground upon which the Court of Appeals upheld the injunction is not
clear. Judge Finch, writing for the majority, states that "what is here
enjoined is the inducement by the Musicians' Union of the Stagehands' Union
to enter into a combination to destroy the business of the plaintiff solely because
machinery instead of live musicians is used."'3  He is careful to point out,
however, that the court is not denying the right of the members of any union
to strike "because machinery is employed or for any other reason." 4 From this
it would seem that the basis for the injunctive relief is that the two unions had
entered into a "combination" or "conspiracy" to wreck the plaintiff's business.
The rationale of the decision seems to be that the court will not enjoin union
activity so long as it is a legitimate "labor dispute", that the cases and the
New York Anti-Injunction Act3 have marked out what types of activity fall
within this category, that a strike arising from a grievance against the use
of labor-saving machinery cannot, on the basis of the cases and the Act, be
characterized as a "labor dispute", and that therefore any combination of
workingmen who engage in this type of activity may be enjoined, since the
combination is no longer protected by the immunity which it would otherwise
have even though it threatened to destroy the employer's business.
The injunction, however, forbids both unions from interfering, by way of
combination or otherwise, with the opera company on the ground that it uses
mechanically recorded music.6 Further, the New York Anti-Injunction Act
provides that in a labor'dispute no court shall prohibit a strike "on the ground
that the persons engaged therein constitute an unlawful combination or
conspiracy. ' 7 In other words, since in New York a combination entered into
by workingmen is not unlawful per se, it can only be made unlawful if it has
an unlawful object.8 The effect of the decision, therefore, seems to be that a
strike for the purpose of compelling an employer to abandon the use of
machinery is enjoinable.9
2Reversing 258 App. Div. 516, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 144 (1st Dep't 1940), and agirining
170 Misc. 272, 10 N. Y. S. (2d) 83 (Sup. Ct. 1939). In the Court of Appeals, Lehman,
C. J., wrote a dissent, in which Loughran, J., concurred. The case in the Appellate
Division is noted in (1940) 11 AIR L. REv. 172; (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1054; (1941)
39 MicH. L. REV. 665.
3285 N. Y. at 353, 34 N. E. (2d) at 351.
4Ibid. Compare, however, the court's language, 285 N. Y. 348 at 357: "For a union
to insist that machinery be discarded in order that manual labor may take its place and
thus secure additional opportunity of employment is not a lawful labor objective." The
court does not use the word "strike"; but a union's insistence could only be made effective
by means of a strike, picketing, or a boycott. If by "insist" the court is referring to
"inducement . . . to enter into a combination," still the insistence is illegal only because
its object is illegal. See infra notes 8 and 9 and connected text.
5N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876 (a), L. 1935, c. 477.6Record on Appeal, Vol. I, pp. 26-29.7N. Y. Cxv. PRAC. AcT § 876 (a), L. 1935, c. 477.
SThis is true even at common law. See Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y.
1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919); FRANKFURTER AND GRaEEN, THE LABOR IxJUxcToN (1930)
24-26.9
"It seems to me that it is an injunction against a strike and nothing else." Lehman,
C. J., dissenting, 285 N. Y. 348, 364. See supra note 4 and connected text.
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To reach this conclusion, the court gained only insubstantial guidance from
the cases. The closest analogy in the New York cases-and one upon which
the court relied-is to the situation where the sole owner of a business, who is
unable to meet union demands, discharges his union employees and continues
to run the business himself. In Thompson v. Boekhout,10 the Court of Appeals
had held it unlawful, for the purpose of forcing an employer to hire union
help, to picket the business of an employer who had done this A fortiori, it
was argued, the attempt of a union to force an employer to abandon machines
in order to make room for union employees was illegal. On the other hand,
other cases provided analogies pointing to the opposite conclusion. Thus, in
J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay," picketing was permitted to force an employer to
hire three union men where only one member of another union was employed;
in Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin,12 the court permitted a
union to picket the premises of an employer of non-union labor with the intent
of inducing him to employ only union men; and in National Protective Ass'n
v. Cumining,'8 the court permitted a union to refuse to allow its men to work
with non-union men on non-union made goods. Since these latter cases hold
that it is lawful to strike and picket for the purpose of compelling an employer
to abandon the use of non-union labor, it could be argued that it was likewise
lawful for a union to compel an employer to abandon machinery so that union
men could be employed.
Cases in other jurisdictions seem to be more in point. In Hopkins v.
Oxley Stave Co.,' 4 the court enjoined a strike whose purpose was to force an
employer to abandon the use of barrel hooping machines which had thrown
employees out of work, and in Haverhill Strand Theatre v. Gillen,'5 it was
held to be an unlawful objective for a union to attempt to force a theatre
owner to use an orchestra of live musicians instead of a hand organ. The
court in the principal case relied on both these decisions. The authority of the
Hopkins case, however, is weakened by the fact that the injunction was there
granted partly on the ground that the defendants were undertaking a boycott
which was clearly condemned by federal law. 6 As to the Haverhill case, it
is strange to find the New York court relying on a Massachusetts decision, for
in labor questions the two jurisdictions have followed divergent policies.17
The cases, then, seem to be of little aid. What about the New York Anti-
10273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937) ; see also Luft v. Flove, 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E.
(2d) 369 (1936).11260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932); cf. Dubrow Pure Food, Inc. v. Glazel, N. Y.
L. J., Nov. 23, 1932, p. 2331, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.), aff'd inem. as modified, 263 N. Y.
589, 189 N. E. 712 (1933).
12245 N. Y. 260, 151 N. E. 130 (1927), rehearing denied, 245 N. Y. 651, 157 N. E.
895 (1927).
13170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902).
1483 F. 912 (C. C. A. 8th 1897).
15229 Mass. 413, 118 N. E. 671 (1918). Cf. Bayer v. Brotherhood of Painters, 108 N. J.
257, 154 Ati. 759 (1931) (no injunction against union's refusal to allow its members to
work for employer using mechanical paint spray).
16 The boycott in the Hopkins case could have been enjoined in New York. See
Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 124 N. E. 97 (1919).17See FRANxURtTER AND GaREEx, op. cit. supra note 8, at 29. With the Haverhill case,
compare J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N. Y. 315, 183 N. E. 509 (1932).
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Injunction Act ?18 Does it contain a justification for the strike in the principal
case? If the dispute fell within the definition of a "labor dispute" contained
in the Act, no injunction could have been granted.19 The Act reads:
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms
or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representa-
tion of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment
relations, or any other controversy arising out of the respective interests
of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants
stand in the relation of employer and employee."
The court reasoned that the statute assumed the existence of a human relation-
ship, that there was no such relationship in a strike against the use of a machine,
and that such a strike did not concern conditions of employment; therefore,
there was no labor dispute.
The range of union activity permitted by the statute is ill-defined, so far
as concerns the type of dispute in the principal case. The area blocked off
from judicial control, however, is very broad, especially by the clause which
includes as an unenjoinable activity "any other controversy arising out of the
respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee." Perhaps the
purpose of this provision is to permit campaigns for unionization and to permit
unions to picket the sale by retailers of non-union made products, where there
is usually no employer-employee relationship. The Court of Appeals has
sanctioned such activities as involving the respective interests of employers and
employees.20 The present strike, however, was said not to concern these
interests. The court does not elaborate the point. In Bassert v. Dhuy,
2 1
however, the court has said that union activity "cannot . .'. extend beyond a
point where its . .. direct interests cease." The test, then, seems to be that
of directness of interest. Since a strike against the use of machinery is in
part an attempt by workingmen to control the instruments of production,
over which-in theory, at least-the employer has always had control and
in which workingmen are only indirectly interested, it may be that the statute
was not intended to provide a justification for any threatened interference by
employees with that control. 2 Neither the statute nor the cases, however, are
18Sitpra note 5.19The Act provides that no court shall issue an injunction in a "labor dispute" except
after a hearing and after findings of certain specific facts. Since in the principal case
the requirements as to hearing and findings of fact were not complied with, no injunction
could issue if the dispute were held to be a "labor dispute." Of course, the "danger point"
in the statute is in the meaning of "labor dispute." See Note (1935) 21 CORNaELL L. Q.
640; Note (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 1295; Comment (1937) N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 116;
Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1553.
20May's Furs and Ready-to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. 279 (1940);
Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); Exchange Bakery
and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 151 N. E. 130 (1927).
21221 N. Y. 342, 365, 117 N. E. 582 (1917) ; see also Willson & Adams v. Pearce, 264
N. Y. 521, 191 N. E. 545 (1934).22The scope of this note does not permit any weighing of the economic pros and cons
of technological unemployment. For a full discussion, see NATioAL RESOURCES CoM-
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of assistance in determining where the line is to be drawn between directness
and indirectness of interest.2 3 The line, if it is to be drawn by the courts, must
be drawn empirically.
Of course, any answer which a court gives must contain at least an implied
judgment upon economic and social data. Frankfurter and Greene have
pointed out that the various "keys" which the courts have used to find a
justification for union activity--"the purpose of the injury," "the means by
which it is inflicted," "directness of interest"-really unlock nothing.24  Within
certain limits, which the same writers have called "the allowable area of
economic conflict," 25 union activity is justified even though it creates great
hardship to employers, employees, and the public.2 6 In New York, the
tendency of the Court of Appeals has been to enlarge this "area," and it has
been pointed out that the Anti-Injunction Act was enacted partly for the pur-
pose of clarifying this "liberal" policy of the court.27 Since, as we have shown,
there was doubt whether the present strike fell without the pale of the
"allowable area," it is suggested that the hands-off policy of the court, as
embodied in the statute, should have been controlling.
28
Rex Rowland
New York Civil Practice Act: Section 229b: Service of process on non-
resident natural person doing business in this state-Under Section
229b,1 personal service on a non-resident natural person doing business in
mITTEE, TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS AND ECONOMIC POLICY (1937) 39-67. See also Shulman,
Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 769.23The United States Department of Justice has declared that efforts by unions to
"prevent the use of cheaper material, improved equipment, or more efficient methods"
will be prosecuted as "unquestionable violations of the Sherman Act, supported by no
responsible judicial authority whatever." See letter from Assistant Attorney General
Arnold to the Secretary of the Central Labor Unions of Indianapolis, released as a
"Public Statement" on November 20, 1939, entitled Application of the Anti-Trust Laws
to Labor Unions. For a criticism of the Department's views, see Shulman, supra note 21,
at 779 et seq.2 4FRANKFURTER AND GFEENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 26.25Ibid.26
"To count the cost of union weapons is to count the cost of free competition in
industrial controversy." Id. at 205.27See Comment, The New York Anti-Injunction Act (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 537; Note
(1940) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1054. See also Fraenkel, Judicial Interpretation of Labor Laws
(1940) 6 U. OF CHI. L. Ra-v. 577.28Pound, J., in Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 409, 182 N. E. 63
(1932), has expressed the policy of the court: "The Court of Appeals has for many
years been disposed to leave the parties to peaceful labor disputes unmolested when
economic rather than legal questions were involved." See also May's Furs and Ready-
to-Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. (2d) 279 (1940), opinion by Finch, J. In
American Guild of Musical Artists v. Petrillo, - N. Y. -, 36 N. E. (2d) 123 (1941),
Lehman, C. J., dissenting, condemns the narrow interpretation of the Act in the
principal case.
IL. 1940, c. 99 effective September 1, 1940. Amended L. 1941, c. 455. "Service
of summons on non-resident natural persons doing business in this state. When any
natural person or persons not residing in this state shall engage in business in this state,
in any action against such person or persons arising out of such business, the summons
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the state can be accomplished by mailing the non-resident a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint afid by leaving a copy with the person in charge of his
business at the time of service.2
may be served by leaving a copy thereof with the complaint with the person who, at the
time of service, is in charge of any business in which the defendant or defendants are
engaged within this state, and any summons so served shall be of the same legal force
and validity as if served personally on such non-resident person or persons so engaging
in business in this state within the territorial jurisdiction of the court from which the
summons issues, provided that a copy of such summons and complaint together with a
notice of such service upon such person in charge of such business according to the
provisions of this section shall be forthwith sent to such non-resident person or persons
by registered mail, return receipt requested.
"The plaintiff shall file with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending, or
with the judge or justice of such court in case there be no clerk, an affidavit of compliance
herewith, a copy of the summons and complaint, and either a return receipt purporting
to be signed by the defendant or defendants, or a person qualified to receive his or their
registered mail, in accordance with the rules and customs of the post-office department;
or, if acceptance was refused by the defendant or defendants, or his or their agent, the
original envelope bearing a notation by the postal authorities that receipt was refused, and
an affidavit by or on behalf of the plaintiff that notice of such mailing and refusal was
forthwith sent to the defendant or defendants by ordinary mail.. Where the summons is
mailed to a foreign country, other official proof of the delivery of the mail may be
filed in case the post-office department is unable to obtain such a return receipt. The
foregoing papers shall be filed within thirty days after the return receipt or other official
proof of delivery or the original envelope bearing a notation of refusal, as the case may
be, is received by the plaintiff. Service of process shall be complete ten days after such
papers are filed. The return receipt or other official proof of delivery shall constitute
presumptive evidence that the summons mailed was received by the defendant or
defendants or person qualified to receive his or their registered mail; and the notation of
refusal shall constitute presumptive evidence that the refusal was by the defendant or
defendants or his or their agent.
"Service of such summons may also be made by leaving a copy thereof with the
complaint with the person who, at the time of service, is in charge of the business
of such non-resident defendant or defendants within this state and by, delivering a
duplicate copy thereof, with the complaint annexed thereto, to the defendant or de-
fendants personally without the state by a resident or citizen of the state of New York
or by a sheriff, under-sheriff, deputy-sheriff or constable of the county or other
political subdivision in which the personal service is made, or by an officer authorized by
the laws of this state to take acknowledgments of deeds to be recorded in this state,
or by an attorney and/or counsellor at law, solicitor, advocate or barrister duly qualified
to practice in the state or country where such service is made, or by a United States
marshal or deputy United States marshal. Proof of personal service without the state
shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is pending within thirty
days after such service. Personal service without the state is complete ten days after
proof thereof is filed.
"The court in which the action is pending may order such extensions as may be
necessary to afford the defendant reasonable opportunity to defend !he action."
The only reported case arising under Section 229b, is Miller v. Swann et al., 28 N. Y. S.(2d) 247 (City Ct. N. Y. 1941). Defendants, non-residents, were sued for damage
suffered by plaintiff in a fire in a building, owned by defendants, in New York City.
The defendants owned some forty-two buildings in the city. Held, defendants were doing
business in New York within the meaning of Section.229b. That the owner managed
the property through real estate agents was said to be immaterial. The statute was not
intended to apply only in favor of persons in a contractual relation to, or in privity with,
the non-resident defendant.
2This statute was recommended by the Law Revision Commission of the State of
New York. Leg. Doc. (1940) No. 65 (D). Amendment recommended. Leg. Doc.
(1941) No. 65 (N).
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Some doubt as to the constitutionality of this method of service has been
occasioned by a misunderstanding of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Pennoyer v. Neff3 and Flexner v. Farson.4
In Penuoyer v. Neff an Oregon court attempted to enforce a personal judg-
ment against a non-resident individual. In the original suit service was by
publication while the defendant was residing in California. The United States
Supreme Court, in denying the validity of such service, held that an adjudica-
tion of personal rights and obligations without first obtaining personal service
within the borders of the state, was lacking in due process. In a dictum5 the
court declared:
"Neither do we mean to assert that a state may not require a non-
resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or
making contracts enforceable there to appoint an agent or representative in
the state to receive service of process and notice in legal proceedings in-
stituted with respect to such partnership, associations or contracts, or to
designate a place where such service may be made upon a public officer
designated for that purpose, or in some other prescribed way, and that
judgment rendered upon such service may not be binding upon the non-
residents both within and without the state."
In reliance on this dictum the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld a Ken-
tucky statute6 permitting service on a non-resident individual by serving the
person in charge of his business.7 Other jurisdictions adopted a contrary view
and on the basis of the Pennoyer case held statutes similar to Kentucky's un-
constitutional.8
The Kentucky statute came before the Supreme Court in Flexner v. Farson,9
which arose by a suit in Illinois on a Kentucky judgment. In the Kentucky
suit service was made under the Kentucky non-resident individual service
statute, above mentioned. The defense was that the person served was not
the agent of the defendant at the time of service, that the defendant did not
reside in Kentucky and that the statute was unconstitutional. The United
States Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts
of this case. Kentucky, misinterpreting this decision, reversed its former
position and held jurisdiction could no longer be acquired in the manner fixed
by the statute.' 0 It failed to see that the basis of Flexner v. Farson was that the
person served was not the agent of the defendants at the time of service."'
Because of the decision of the Supreme Court in Flexner v. Farson, the
Law Revision Commission of the State of New York, in drafting Section
395 U. S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565 (1877).
4284 U. S. 289, 65 L. ed. 250 (1918). Note (1919) 3 MiNl. L. REv. 277.
595 U. S. 714, 735, 24 L. ed. 565, 573 (1877).
°KY. CIV. CODE OF PRAC. (1932) § 51 (6).
7Guenther v. American Steel Hoop Co., 116 Ky. 580, 76 S. W. 419 (1903).
8Caldwell v. Armour, 1 Pennewill's Del. Reports 545, 43 Atl. 517 (1899) ; Aikman v.
Sanderson & Porter, 122 La. 265, 47 So. 600 (1908) ; Cabanne v. Graf, 87 Minn. 510, 92,
N. W. 461 (1902).
9284 U. S. 289, 65 L. ed. 250 (1918), noted in (1919) 3 MIT. L. REv. 277.
'OAndrev Bros. v. McClanahan, 22 Ky. 504, 295 S. W. 457 (1927).
"Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623, 628, 79 L. ed. 1097, 1099 (1935). Notes (1935)
20 IowA L. REv. 853; (1935) 33 MicH. L. Rxv. 963.
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229b, was careful to provide that service must be made on the agent of the
individual in New York. In a clarifying amendment in 1941,12 the legislature,
acting on the advice of the Commission,' 2' changed the statute so as to make it
specifically provide that the person served must be the agent at the time of
service.
A situation not provided for in Section 229b arises when a non-resident
individual withdraws his agent from the state after a cause of action has arisen
but before the service of a process. As a remedy for such situations, the
Secretary of State should be made the agent to receive service. It might' be
contended that the principle of Flexner v. Farson would prohibit such amend-
ment. It is the opinion of the writer, in view of subsequent decisions, that
Flexner v. Farson would not be controlling. Statutes permitting service
on the Secretary of State have been enacted and upheld in New York 3 as
well as in other jurisdictions.' 4 In Hess v. Pawlowski,15 a Massachusetts non-
resident motorist statute was upheld. The statute provided for substituted
service on the registrar for motor vehicles and such service was equivalent to
personal service on the non-resident. This Was upheld as an exercise of the
police power.16 The purpose of such statute is to enable a citizen to maintain
an action in his own court against a non-resident. It is ieally a procedural
regulation and not a police regulation.' 7 In view of this, service on the
Secretary of State should be valid in the situation supposed, where the agent
is withdrawn after a cause of action arises.' 8
Section 229b contains no indication as to whether it applies to a non-resident
individual doing only interstate business. A Kentucky statute,19 which re-
quired a foreign corporation doing business within the state to appoint an
agent for service, was interpreted to apply to a corporation doing only an
interstate business in Kentucky and the constitutionality of the statute as thus
interpreted was upheld in International Harvester Company v. Kentucky.20
12L. 1941, c. 455.
'-
2 Leg. Doc. (1941) No. 65 (N).
13N. Y. VEHICLE AND TF. LAW § 52, L. 1928, c. 465, Shushereba v. Ames, 255 N. Y.
490, 175 N. E. 187 (1931).
I
4MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 90 §§ 3A, 3B; Hess v. Pawlowski,
274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927). MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 2684-8;
A. E. Schilling v. J. Adlebak, 177 Minn. 90, 225 N. W. 694 (1929).
15247 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
'
6
"The police power in its broadest sense includes all legislation and almost every
function of civil government .... It embraces regulations designed to promote public
convenience or the general prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended
to promote the public safetyor the public health." Mr. Justice Day in Sligh v. Kirkwood,
237 U. S. 52, 59, 35 Sup. Ct. 501, 502 (1914).
17Stoner v. Higginson, et al., 316 Pa. 481, 175 Atl. 527 (1934).81In Section 229b service has purposely been directed at an agent to avoid possible
constitutional difficulties. It is the belief of the writer that it would be constitutional
to appoint the Secretary of State as agent for service when the agent in charge of the
business is withdrawn after a cause of action has arisen. Quaere whether a statute per-
mitting service on the Secretary of State would be constitutional when applied to a non-
resident individual who ships goods into New York and has no agent in this state.
Quaere whether the state of the sender of the goods could enact a similar statute and
subject the New Yorker to service. Cf. Kerr v. Tagliavia, 101 Misc. 614, 168 N. Y.
Supp. 697 (Sup. Ct. 1917), aff'd, 229 N. Y. 542, 129 N. E. 907 (1920) ; Pope v. Heckscher,
266 N. Y. 114, 194 N. E. 687 (1935).
19Ky. CiV. CODE OF PRAC. § 51 (3).
20234 U. S. 579, 58 L. ed. 1479 (1914).
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Under the non-resident motorist statutes the non-resident is liable to process
by virtue of using the state's roads regardless of the fact his use may have
been only on an interstate trip.21 It would seem, therefore, that the New
York courts would be justified in interpreting 229b to apply to causes of
action arising from interstate business only.
If, in interpreting 229b, the courts follow their interpretation of Section
229,22 which provides for service on foreign corporations doing business in
New York, they might hold that Section 229b only affects an individual who
is doing some intrastate business. A contrary decision would make in
personam jurisdiction possible in the case of a non-resident individual, when
a foreign corporation conducting the same business would not be subject to
such jurisdiction. It would be advisable to correct this inconsistency by
enacting a statute similar in form to 229b, which would apply to foreign
corporations. 23
The real need for substituted service is in the case of an individual or
corporation who is doing interstate business through an agent and has no
property in the state. Usually the non-resident doing intrastate business will
have some property in the state which can be proceeded against by attachment.
It has been contended24 that Section 229b, in relation to Section 229a,25
has created a disparity when applied to a non-resident partnership. The
contention is that under Section 229a service on one of the partners subjects
the property of the partnership and the separate property of the partners
served to the satisfaction of a judgment against the partnership, whereas, under
229b, service on the agent of a partnership will subject to attachment the
property of the partnership and the separate property of all the partners. This
contention does not seem sound. Under 229b there still must be service on a
partner before his separate property could become subject to an adverse
judgment.
Assume there are three non-resident partners with an agent in New York
in charge of their business. Before the separate property of any one of them
21 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 161, 61 L. ed. 223 (1916).22 Foreign corporations must file papers with the Secretary of State and if they fail to
they may not sue in the courts of New York. As applied to interstate commerce such
provision is unconstitutional. Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope, 235 U. S. 197, 59 L. ed. 193(1914).230n the principle of International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 58 L. ed.
1479 (1914), such statute would be constitutional. Quaere as to whether a statute would
be constitutional which made the Secretary of State agent for service on a foreign
corporation sending goods into New York with no agent in this state. In the case of
an individual such procedure might constitute an undue hardship, but in the case of a
corporation defense of a suit under such circumstances would usually not be a hardship
on any but a small corporation. The statute might exempt corporations of a low
capitalization.24Notes (1940) 25 ST. JoEN's L. Rav. 1, 21; (1941) 10 FoRD. L. REv. 126, 129.25N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 229a provides: "Personal service of summons upon a co-
partnership. In any action, legal or equitable, against a partnership carrying on business
in this state or holding property therein, service of the summons upon any partner shall
be sufficient service upon the partnership and shall be sufficient to authorize judgment
against the partnership and the partners actually separately served, and the judgment
rendered in favor of the plaintiff shall operate against the real and personal property
of the partnership and the separate property of the partners separately served."
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could become subject to a judgment against the partnership he must be served
by mailing process to him and by leaving a copy of the process, addressed to
him, with the agent. Then, for the purpose of this statute, the agent would
be a separate agent for each member and thus would receive three copies of
process.
Richard E. Macey
Res judicata: Application of doctrine to derivative liability situation:
Effect of recovery by master on suit brought by servant against same
defendant.-In Elderv. New York and Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc.,
284 N. Y. 350, 31 N., E. (2d); 188 (1940), trucks owned by Penn (Penn-
sylvania Motor Express, Inc.) and United (United States Trucking Cor-
poration) collided. Each brought an action for property damage against the
other and, the suits being consolidated, the jury brought in a verdict for
United. Elder, the driver of United's truck, then brought suit against Penn
for personal injuries and moved for a directed verdict, claiming that the
judgment obtained by United was conclusive of Penn's negligence and his
own freedom from contributory negligence. The trial court refused the
motion and, on trial, Elder was defeated. The appellate division reversed
on the ground that the issues were res judicata and sent the case back for
assessment of damages. The Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting re-
versed and held the absence of mutuality of estoppel prevented the applica-
tion of res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered upon the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a matter
within its jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies
in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit.' The doctrine has been limited by the rule that a party cannot take
advantage of res judicata'unless he would have been bound by an opposite
result. This is commonly referred to as the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel.2
The master-servant relationship, like other relationships involving a deriva-
tive liability,3 does not create privity between the parties since it does not
establish any mutual or successive relationship to rights of property.4 Nor is
1Italics added. 2 FREEMAN ON JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 1322, citing Wiley v. Mc-
Comas, 137 Md. 637, 113 Atl. 98 (1921). For other similar statements see Vicksburg v.
Henson, 231 U. S. 259, 268, 34 Sup. Ct. 36 (1913) ; Keith v. Willers Truck Service,
64 'S. D. 274, 276, 266 N. W. 256 (1936).
21 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 929, 930; Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co.,
225 U. S. 111, 127, 32 Sup. Ct. 641 (1911) ; St. John v. Fowler, 229 N. Y. 270, 128 N.E.
199 (1920).3This would include principal-agent and indemnitor-indemnitee relationships.
4Haverhill v. International Ry. Co., 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N. Y. Supp. 522 (4th
Dep't 1926), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 582, 155 N. E. 605 (1927) ; Chapman v. L. E. Waterman
Co., 176 App. Div. 697, 707, 163 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (1st Dep't 1917); Gadsden v. Crafts
and Co., 175 N. C. 358, L. R. A. 1918E, 226, 95 S. E. 610 (1918); 1 GREENLEAF ON
EVIDENCE (6th ed. 1899) § 523;' 1 FREEMAN ON JTJDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 1029. A
few courts have considered identity in substance controlling, regardless of the failure of
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either party bound by a recovery against the other when he did not partici-
pate in the prior suit.5 .; Yet, despite this lack of privity and despite the fact
that the estoppel of the judgment would not be mutual, an exception has been
introduced in cases involving a derivative liability. 6 Thus, even though the
master would not be bound by a prior judgment against the servant in an
action to which he was not a party,7 he can, when sued, take advantage of a
prior judgment in favor of the servant.8 Stated more broadly, a person
secondarily liable may take advantage of a successful defense on the merits by
the one primarily liable.9 Naturally, however, a different result would obtain
if the second suit were instituted on any basis other than that of respondeat
superior.'0
It was established in Good Health Dairy Products Corp.,v. Emery"' that
the master might take advantage of this prior judgment even where the ser-
vant was plaintiff in the former action.12 In this case the court reasoned that
"one who has had his day in court should not be permitted to litigate the
issues anew." The plaintiff had his' chance in the prior action to prove the
servant's negligence and his own due care; since he failed, there is no reason
for giving him another hearing on the same issues. In the principal case,
Penn, too, had its opportunity to prove the negligence of Elder and the free-
dom from contributory negligence on the part of its own driver-it "had its
day in court"-and yet the court holds that these issues are not res Judicata
against Penn and should be tried de nova.'3 The majority of the court in
true privity. Note (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 889, citing Sunshine Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U. S. 381, 402, 60 Sup. Ct. 907 (1939), and Gibson v. Solomon, 136 Oh. St. 101,
23 N. E. (2d) 996 (1939).5Pesce v. Brecher, 302 Mass. 211, 19 N. E: (2d) 36 (1939), distinguishing McAlevey
v. Litch, 234 Mass. 440, 125 N. E. 606 (1919) ; Haverhill v. International Ry. Co., 217
App. Div. 521, 217 N. Y. Supp. 522 (4th'Dep't 1926), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 582, 155 N. E.
605 (1927) ; see Rookard v. Atlanta and C. A. L. R. Co., 84 S. C. 190, 192, 65 S. E.
1047 (1909). But cf. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Ballin, 106 S. C. 45, 90 S. E. 327
(1916) (holding judgment against insurer is evidence of extent of loss in action against
agent for failure to cancel policy).
GGood Health Dairy Products Corp. v. Emery, 275 N. Y. 14, 17, 9 N. E. (2d) 758
(1937), quoting, Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 'U. S. 111, 32 Sup. Ct. 641
(1911); see cases collected in Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence,
158 Fed.' Rep. 63 (C. C. A. 8th 1907).
7See note 5 supra.
8 Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 158 Fed. Rep. 63 (C. C. A.
8th 1907) ; Featherston v. President of Newburgh and Cochecton Turnpike Co., 71 Hun.
109, 24 N. Y. Supp. 603 (Sup. Ct. 1893) ; see Rookard v. Atlanta and C. A. L. R. Co.,
84 S. C. 190, 192, 65 S. E. 1047 (1909) ; cf. Emery v. Fowler, 39 Me. 326, 63 Am. Dec.
627 (1855), and Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 179 N. E. 246 (1931) (cases
holding that a servant can take advantage of a prior judgment in favor of the master).
9 Sawyer v. Norfolk, 136 Va. 66, 116 S. E. 245 (1923); Betor v. Albany, 193 App.
Div. 349, 184 N. Y. Supp. 44 (3rd Dep't 1920).
10 Sutter v. Kansas ;City, 138 Mo. App. 105, 119 S. W. 1084 (1909) ; Johnson Co. v.
Philadelphia, 236 Pa. 510, 84 AUt. 1014 (1912).
3"275 N. Y. 14, 9 N. E. (2d) 758 (1937).
12 See also Blue Valley Creamery Co. v. Cronimus, 270 Ky. 496, 110 S. W. (2d) 286
(1937).
13This is to be distinguished from a situation in which Penn would be plaintiff only
in the prior action. In such event, judgment for United would establish only Penn's
negligence without deciding whether United was also guilty of negligence. Clearly,
Elderly could not plead such, a judgment as res judicata.
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the principal case (including Judge Finch, who wrote both opinions, Chief
Judge Lehman, and Judge 'Loughran, all three of whom took the majority
view in the Good Health case) distinguished the Good Health case on the
grounds .that the plea was there entered as a defense and that if the second
suit were allowed and judgment was against the master, he would be entitled
to reimbursement from his servant who had previously been adjudged free
from any negligence. Furthermore, says the court, to allow the plea of res
judicata here would eliminate entirely the requirements of mutuality and
privity and, in so doing, overrule authority and basic conceptions.1 4
.Yet it is submitted that, in addition to the derivative liability exception of
the Good Health case, the rule of mutuality has been overthrown to a certain
extent in other legal fields. Where the question is whether a prior criminal
conviction can be pleaded as a bar to a .civil suit, New York takes an inter-
mediate position in holding that the conviction, although not a bar, is prima
facie evidence of the facts involved.1 5 This is true even though a plaintiff in
a civil suit cannot introduce a prior acquittal in a criminal prosecution."8
Again, referring to the old rule that there could bq no decree of specific per-
formance unless there was mutuality of remedy, the late Judge Cardozo has
said, "If there ever was a rule that mutuality of remedy ... is a condition
of equitable relief, it has been so qualified by exceptions that, viewed as a
precept of general validity, it has ceased toabe a rule today."',7
Thus, even though the Good Health case can be reconciled with the prin-
cipal case by resort to the factual differences, it seems that the divergence can
better be explained in terms of theories adopted. The court, in both the
Good Health case and the minority opinion of the principal case, asks whether
the party against whom the plea of res judicata is made has had an oppor-
tunity to be heard on these allegedly adjudicated issues; if so, those issues
are res judicat6 and will not be retried. On the other hand, the test of the
principal case is whether there is a mutuality of estoppel, and the court, un-
willing to gnaw at the rule any further, limits the Good Health case to its
facts.
'
4Haverhill v. International Ry. Co., 217 App. Div. 521, 217 N' Y. Supp. 522 (4th
Dep't 1926), aff'd, 244 N. Y. 582, 155 N. E.'605 (1927) ; Nelsort v. Brown, 144 N. Y.
384, 390, 39 N. E. 355 (1895) ; Booth v. Powers, 56-N. Y. 22 (1874) ; Atlantic Dock
Co. v. Mayor, 53 N. Y. 64, 68 (1873). In thd Haverhill case, on very similar facts,
the court refused to allow the plaintiff employer to introduce the prior judgment in
favor of his employee on the ground that there was no mutuality of estoppel.
This doctrine was reiterated in two recent Appellate Division cases: Goodman v.
Kirshberg, 261 App. Div. 257, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 113 (1st Dep't 1941), and Daly v.
Terpening, 261 App. Div. 423, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 160 (4th Dep't 1941).
15 Schindler v. Royal Insurance Co., 258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711 (1932); (1939)
N. Y. Leg. Doc., No. 65 (J). However, the weight of authority still maintains that
a conviction in a criminal prosecution does not bar a subsequent civil action, nor is it
even admissable in evidence, (1939) N. Y. Leg. Doc., No. 65 (J) ; Betts v. New Hart-
ford, 25 Conn. 180 (1856) ; Marceau v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 101 Cal. 338, 35 Pac.
856 (1894). Contra, Eagle Star and British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82,
140 S. E. 314 (1927).
16Stone v. United States, 167,U. S. 178, 17 Sup. Ct. 778 (1897) ; Vadney v. Albany
Ry. Co., 47 App. Div. 207, 62 N. Y. Supp. 140 (3rd Dep't 1900) ; see Farley v. Patterson,
166 App. Div. 358, 360, 152 N. Y. Supp. 59 (3rd Dep't 1915).
17 Cardozo, J., in Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 493, 135 N. E. 861 (1922), citing
Stone, The Mutuality Rule in New York (1916) 16 COL. L. REv. 433.
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It is not the purpose of this note tG advocate the adoption of. one theory
to the exclusion of the other inasmuch as it is merely a question of weighing
the pros and cons. Against the rule of the Good Health case has been argued
the danger that a sympathetic jury might bring in a verdict against a wealthy
corporate defendant without realizing its effect on later valid claims.18
Furthermore, this rule would force a defendant to "go the limit" in defending
against every small claim for fear that he might be bound by it in subsequent
suits involving large claims.19
In favor of the Good Health rule it might be said that if, in the principal
case, Penn were suing Elder, Penn would be bound by the prior judgment;
it does seem somewhat anomalous to say that what is res judicata against
a party as plaintiff is not res judicata against him as defendant. Also, from
a practical viewpoint, this rule would obviate the necessity for a 'jury trial
in many instances and thus ease an already overburdened and lagging calen-
dar, yet being fair to all concerned.
Recent cases in the lower courts have followed the rule of the principal case
in the driver-passenger situation.20 Since this is not a derivative liability
relationship, the Court of Appeals would have even more reason to uphold
these rulings if and when the cases are appealed.
Jerome S. Affron
Taxation: Income Tax: Capital gains or losses: Reenactment rule: Date
of acquisition of a testamentary bequest.-Section 113 (a) (5) of the
Internal 'Revenue Code' provides that in' determining the capital gain or loss
of a taxpayer who sells or exchanges property acquired by bequest, devise,
or inheritance, the basis shall be the value of the property "at the time of such
acquisition". This phrase, which traces its ancestry without a break to the
Revenue Act of 1934,2 and even further to the Act of 1918,3 was held to mean
the time of testator's death when the remainderman acquired a vested in-
terest under the will. But if the remainderman originally acquired only a
contingenf interest, "time of acquisition" was once held to mean the time at
18For an extremely comprehensive discussion of the entire problem in addition to this
point see Note (1938-39) 8 BRooxLYN L. REv. 224. This argument is raised at p. 234.
19Van Moschzisker, Res Judicata, (1939) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 303.20Goodman v. Kirshberg, 261 App. Div. 257, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 113 (1st Dep't 1941)
(prior suit successfully brought by driver of other car: passenger now sues driver) ;
Bisnoff v. Hermann, 260 App. Div. 663, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 719 (2d Dep't 1940) (prior
suit successfully brought against driver by a fellow passenger of the present plaintiff).
IlIzr. REv. CoDt § 113 (a) (5) (1939).
2§ 113 (a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 49 STAT. 706, 26 U. S. C. § 1131 (1934) ;
§ 113 (a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1936, 49 STAT. 1682, 26 U. S. C. § 113 (1936) ;
§ 113 (a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 490, 26 U. S. C. § 113 (1938).
3§ 202 (a) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 STAT. 1060; § 202 (a) (3) of the
Revenue Act of 1921, 42 STAT. 229; § 204 (a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 STAT.
258, 26 U. S. C. § 204 (1924); § 204 (a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT.
14, 26 U. S. C. § 204 (1926).
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which his interest vested.4 In Helvering v. Reynolds, 61 Sup. Ct. 971
(1941), however, the Supreme Court has exploded this distinction.
Richard J. Reynolds, Sr. set up a testamentary trust of securities which
had cost him $100,000, income to go to his son, R. J. Reynolds, Jr., until the
son should reach 29 years of age, at which time the son was to receive the
principal; but if the son should die before reaching 28, the principal was to go
elsewhere. When the father died in 1918, the securities were worth $110,000.
In 1934, when the son reached 28 and the securities were distributed to him,
they were worth $200,000. Later in 1934, the son sold the securities for
$175,000. In reporting his capital gain or loss under Section 113 (a) (5) of
the Revenue Act og 1934,5 he used as his basis the value of the securities on
the date of their distribution to. him, and reported a loss of $25,000. The
Commissioner ruled that the proper basis was the value on the date of the
father's death ($110,000), and that the son had realized a gain of $65,000.
Under state law, the son had a contingent remainder, 6 and he contended that
the basis of the securities was their value on the date the remainder vested.
Not until he reached his 28th birthday was he sure of receiving the securities.
But the Supreme Court held that the proper basis of the securities was their
value on thei date of the father's death. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and Mr.
justice Roberts dissented.7
The majority reasoned that the test of when property is "acquired" is not
whether the taxpayer had full enjoyment of it prior to the delivery of the
securities but whether earlier he had acquired any interest which had ripened
ultimately into complete ownership. The Court indicated that if a taxpayer
finally gets full ownership of property and sells it, he is taxable on all gain
in value since he acquired his initial interest in the property, no matter how
remote, how contingent, how incapable of vesting that interest seemed at
its outset.
The two dissenting justices maintained that through countless decisions,
administrative rulings, and statutory reenactment, "the time of such acquisi-
tion" as to contingent interests had come to mean the date the contingency
was resolved and the interest vested.
All the Revenue Acts from that of 1918 to that of 1926 provided that if
4Reynolds v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 804 (C. C. A. 4th 1940) and cases cited
therein. See especially Lane v. Corwin, 63 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 2d 1933) cert. denied,
290 U. S. 644 (1933) (contingent interest); Forbes v. Commissioner, 82 F. (2d) 204
(C. C. A. 1st 1936) (contingent interest) ; Chandler v. Field, 63 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A.
1st 1933) (vested interest) ; Beers v. Commissioner, 78 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 3d 1935)
(vested interest).
548 STAT. 706, 26 U. S. C. § 113 (1934).6Reynolds v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 201 N. C. 267, 159 S. E. 416 (1931);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C. 578, 182 S. E. 341 (1935). See discussion in Reynolds
v. Commissioner, 114 F. (2d) 804, 807 (C. C. A. 4th 1940).7The majority of" the Court in the Reynolds case also stated that as to securities
purchased by the trustee and later distributed to the remainderman, the taxpayer's basis
was cost to the trustee. The Court reasoned that § 113 (a) (5) applied only to prop-
erty acquired by will; that property purchased by the trustee was not a part of the
original inheritance transmitted by will at the testator's death; and that, therefore, the
basis should be cost under § 113 (a) rather than value at date of acquisition under § 113
(a) (5).
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property was acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, or by the decedent's
estate from the decedent, the taxpayer's basis for determining capital gain
or loss should be the fair market value of such property "at the time of such
acquisition." s In 1920, the Treasury construed this phrase to mean that
vested interests were to be valued at the testator's death, but that contingent
interests were to be valued at the time they vested.9 This construction pre-
vailed until 1926, when the Court of Claims, in McKinney v. United States,1°
held that the proper basis for personal property sold by an executor was
its value when the testator bought it, not its value when he died. Congress,
alarmed by this decision, changed the basis section of the 1928 Act to provide
that the basis of realty or a specific bequest of personalty should be its fair
market value at decedent's death, but that the basis of a general bequest of
personalty should be its fair market value at the time of distribution to the
taxpayer; and that if the property, whether real or personal, was acquired by
the decedent's estate from the decedent, the fair market value at the time
the decedent died should be the basis to the estate." This provision was
carried over into the 1932 Act.'2
Meanwhile, in Brewster v. Gage (1930),13 the Supreme Court overruled
the McKinatey case and held that under the 1918 Act, value at "time of
acquisition" meant value at testator's death, for a general bequest of personal
property as well as for a specific bequest.' 4
The remainder interest in the Brewster case was admittedly vested. The
Supreme Court did not purport to pass upon the "time of acquisition" of
contingent interests. Cases current at the time of the Brewster decision still
sSuPra, note 1.
90. D. 727, 3 Cum. Bull. 53 (1920). See also I. T. 1622, Cum. Bull. 1I-1 135 (1923);
S. 0. 35, 3 Cum. Bull. 50 (1920).
1062 Ct. Cl. 180 (1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 716 (1926).
1§ 113 (a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1928, 45 STAT. 819, 26 U. S. C. § 113 (1928).12§ 113 (a) (5) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 199, 26 U. S. C. § 113 (1928).
The question of the "date of distribution to the taxpayer" of a general bequest of per-
sonalty held in testamentary trust was decided at the last term of the Supreme Court
in Maguire v. Commissioner, 61 Sup. Ct. 789 (1941) ; Helvering v. Gambrill, 61 Sup.
Ct. 795 (1941); and Helvering v. Campbell, 61 Sup. Ct. 798 (1941). The court held
that "date of distribution to the taxpayer" meant the date the trust property was received
by the trustees from the executor. Even if the taxpayer's original remainder interest was
contingent, his gain or loss was calculated on the difference in value of the property
between the date it was received by the trustee (the date the trust was created and the
taxpayer acquired his initial interest in the property) and the date the property was sold.
It is difficult to understand how the court concluded that Congress intended "date of
distribution to the taxpayer" to mean the date the property was delivered to the trustee,
and not the date the trust was determined and the res distributed to the benwficiary,
whose tax was in question.
The Maguire, Campbell, and Gambrill cases also decided that in the case of securities
purchased by the trustee and later distributed to the beneficiary, the taxpayer-
beneficiary's basis should be cost to the trustee. The Court's reasoning was followed
in the Reynolds case, supra note 7.
13280 U. S. 327, 50 Sup. Ct. 115 (1930).
140f course, under the common law rule, title to real property passed to specific or gen-
eral devisees upon the owner's death. At the time Brewster v. Gage was decided, it was
well settled that a devise of real property was acquired the date the testator died, rather
than the date the decree of distribution was entered.
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held that the basis of a contingent interest acquired by will was its value
when it vested.15 In 1932, in an exhaustive analysis, the General Counsel of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue reiterated this principle as settled adminis-
trative practice.16
In 1934 Congress reenacted the language of the 1926 Act. The Con-
gressional committee explained that the changed basis provision of the 1928
Act had been occasioned by doubt as to the meaning of "time of acquisition",
but that this language had been so clarified by Brewster v. Gage that reenact-
ment of the 1926 language would now/ establish a uniform basis for all prop-
erty passing at death, whether real or personal.17 Congress was apparently
concerned with the executorship problem raised in the McKinney case,
rather than with the distinction between "vested" and "contingent" future
interests, and the uniformity desired was that between realty and personalty.
The legislative reports 8 show that in 1934, when Congress readopted value
at the time of acquisition as the basis, it recognized the then existing distinc-
tion between "vested" and "contingent" interests. Yet in 1935, in interpreting
the newv Revenue Act in its regulations, the Treasury ruled that all title to
property acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance relates back to the date
of decedent's death, no matter what the legal nature of the taxpayer's interest
at that time.19
Against this background, it is immediately apparent that the Reynolds case
turns largely upon the effect of the 1934 reenactment upon previous ad-
ministrative and judicial rulings under the Acts of 1926 and earlier.
The so-called reenactment rule is a general doctrine that Congress, by re-
enacting a statute which has been construed in a prior administrative or
judicial ruling, thereby approves the ruling and makes it to some extent a
part of the statute.2 0 Just to what extent is not quite clear. Some decisions
seem to hold that reenactment of a statute invests prior administrative con-
struction(with the "force of law".21 Others look upon the reenactment rule
as a mere aid in statutory construction which does not exclude other aids or
the court's sense of what is just.22 Still'other decisions look primarily to
15Supra note 2.
16G. C. M. 10260; XI-1 Cum. Bull. 79 (1932).
17H. R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 27; SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF INCOmE TAX LAws (1938) 344.
18H. R. RE'. No. 704, supra note 14.
19U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 113 (a) (5) (b) ; cf. 0. D. 727, 3 Cum. Bull. 53 (1920).
See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 103, Art. 113 (a) (5) (b).20For a general discussion of the application of the re-enactment principle in federal
tax cases, see 1 PAUL & MERTEls, LAw OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION (1934) § 3.16-
3.20. See also: Brown, Regulations, Re-enactnent, and the Revenue Act (1941) 54
HAgv. L. Rav. 377 and cases cited therein; Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in
Statutory Construction (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 660; Surrey, Scope and Effect of Treasury
Regulations under Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes (1940) 88 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 556;
Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem (1941) 54 HARv. L. REv. 398.21 See Hartley-v. Commissioner, 295 U. S. 216, 220, 55 Sup. Ct. 832 (1935); Helvering
v. Winmill, 305 U. S. 79, 83, 59 Sup. Ct. 45 (1938); Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 306 U. S. 110, 59 Sup. Ct 423 (1939).22See Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 375, 378, 51 Sup. Ct. 144
(1931); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, 101, 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (1939).
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Congressional intention, and hold that reenactment of a statute is a mani-
festation of Congressional approval of its administrative construction.28 But
even under the strict "force of law" formulation, the rule has many excep-
tions. If the prior administrative ruling is contrary to the terms of the
statute,24 if it is ambiguous, uncertain, or to be effective only for a short
time,25 if the ruling was merely an informal one,26 if it was required by a
court decision,27 if the result it points to is clearly unreasonable 2 ----in all these
cases, courts have had little difficulty disregarding the theoretical effect of
reenactment.
Unquestionably the dissenters in the present case seek to follow the
"force of law" concept, while the majority of the Court regard the 1934
reenactment of "time of acquisition" as a mere aid in statutory construction.
The majority here, as in the Hallock29 and Wilshire30 cases, refuse to bring
into the tax field strict notions of reenactment which would limit the Treas-
ury's rule-making power for the future. In the interest of the more efficient
and practical administration of a tax statute, the Court is willing to pay only
lip service to the reenactment principle, and to give greater weight to the new
Treasury regulation.
The majority's approach to the principle of stare decisis resembles that
taken in the Hallock case. 31 Even though the question here raised was one of
statutory construction, where the Supreme Court had always favored a rigid
adherence to precedent,3 2 the Court overturns much uniform judicial con-
structon. The majority of the Court states that the distinction drawn between
"vested" and "contingent" interests under the old interpretation was incon-
sistent with the purpose of the revenue laws and impaired the efficiency of
their administration.
This new attitude has much to commend it. Many tax writers have pointed
out the evils of the strict application of the reenactment rule and stare
23See Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269, 53 Sup. Ct. 337
(1933); Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U. S. 264, 270, 58 Sup. Ct. 880 (1938). See also
Brown, Regulations, Re-enactment, and the Revenue Act (1941) 54 IIARv. L. REV.
377, 381.24Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269, 273, 53 Sup. Ct. 337
(1933) ; Louisville & N. R. R. v. United States, 282 U. S. 740, 51 Sup. Ct. 297 (1931);
Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co., 265 U. S. 315, 44 Sup. Ct. 488 (1924).25Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 U. S. 389, 60 Sup. Ct. 337, (1940); Hesslein v.
-oey, 91 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756 (1937).26Helvering v. N. Y. Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455, 468, 54 Sup. Ct. 806 (1934).27H-iggins v. Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940); Helvering v. Hallock,
309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444 (1940).28Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 53, 60 Sup. Ct. 51 (1939).29Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 121, 60 Sup. Ct. 444 (1940). See also Van
Vranken v. Helvering, 115 F. (2d) 709 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); Cary v. Helvering, 116
F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
301elvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U. S. 90, 110, 60 Sup. Ct. 18 (1940).
8 lSupra note 26.
32It used to be stated as a general rule that where mere statutory construction was
involved, the rule of stare decisis would be rigidly applied; but where constitutionality
was raised and Congress could afford no remedy, the Court would be quite willing to
reconsider and reverse its former rulings. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U. S. 393, 405, 52 Sup. Ct. 443 (1931); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 77,
58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1937).
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decisis. 3 3 These experts feel that with changing conditions, the meaning of
a statute should be determined by weighing all factors-past legislative his-
tory, Congressional reenactment, stare decisis, new Treasury regulations, ad-
ministrative practice and convenience-as aids in statutory construction. And
in the present case, the Court, following this approach, has sanctioned the
new Treasury interpretation because of the administrative advantages of uni-
formity, prevention of tax manipulation, and ease of computation which
justify it.
Under the old rule, the taxpayer's basis depended on whether property
acquired by bequest was absolutely vested, vested subject to divestment, or
merely contingent, and this in turn depended upon local property law.3 4 The
legal nature of the taxpayer's interest would vary from state to state, and
often identical bequests under the same will would be held by different
courts in the same jurisdiction to create different interests.35
The new rule pushes medieval concepts of vesting out of tax law- and taxes
all testamentary bequests ultimately received and sold on a single, uniform
basis.
Under the old rule, if the interest the taxpayer held was contingent and
gain or loss was measured from the date the contingency was resolved, any
value added or lost between the date the testator died and the date the re-
mainderman's interest vested was not taken into account. 36
Under the new rule, no longer may part of the gain in value of contingent
interests go tax free. Nor is the taxpayer deprived of the right to deduct full
losses, including the amount by which his interest fell in value before it
vested.8
7
33Suprac note 17.34Supra note 2.35See, for example, the attempts by the Board of Tax Appeals to deal with the
peculiarities of New York law in the field of vested and contingent remainders. Eliza-
beth B. Wallace, 27 B. T. A. 902 (1933); Louis C. Raegner, Jr., 29 B. T. A. 1243
(1934). In both of these cases limitations which would probably have been "contingent"
in most states were held to be "vested" under the New York rule.3 6In the case of a residuary legatee the capital gain or loss during the trust petiod
cannot be taxed to the trustee at distribution because the distribution of the trust prop-
erty by the trustee to the residuary legatee is not such a "sale or exchange" as will give
rise to taxable capital gain. Only where there is a bequest in trust to a general legatee
of a stated amount of money,' payable in securities at the trustee's election, has the
trustee's distribution to the beneficiary been held to be a "sale or exchange". Wm. R.
Kenan, Jr., 40 B. T. A. 824 (1939). See also Suisman v. Eaton, 15 Fed. Supp. 113
(D. Conn. 1935). The courts have reasoned that in such a case, the general legatee does
not take his share as beneficiary, but as a "purchaser," for he gives up his pecuniary claim
against the estate as consideration for the securities distributed to him. Under such a
doctrine it has been held by the Board of Tax Appeals that if the "purchaser-beneficiary"
subsequently sells his securities, his basis for computing taxable gain is their value at
the time of "purchase"-the time the securities were distributed to him by the executor
or trustee. Sherman Ewing, 40 B. T. A. 912 (1939).
The Supreme Court has not yet considered the problem raised by the Kenan and
Ewing cases. If it accepts the distinction made by the Board of Tax Appeals, the
basis announced in the Rey~wlds case may well apply only to securities received and
sold by a residuary legatee.3TSee Augustus v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 38, 40 (C. C. A. 6th 1941); Van
Vranken v. Helvering, 115 F. (2d) 709, 711 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
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Finally, the old rule required an independent appraisal of the property at
the date the contingency was resolved and the interest vested. The new rule
avoids this expensive intervening valuation: the estate tax valuation will
usually supply the value of the property.at the new basic date-at the death
of the testator.38
Though many undoubtedly will condemn the Court's decision as gross ju-
dicial legislation, the result reached in the Reynolds case seems sound from
the standpoint of tax policy. The Supreme Court has solved a long pressing
administrative problem with a clear, uniform, easily applied rule. If property
is acquired by bequest, devise, or inheritance, and is ultimately sold, capital
gain or loss will be measured by the difference between the sale price and the
value at the time the testator died. It is to be hoped that the Court's future
tax decisions will enunciate guiding principles as clear cut and simple as
this.3
9
Sa el M. Schatz
Taxation: Income tax: Short term trusts: Recent developments in the
Clifford doctrine.-Few cases in recent years have aroused as much contro-
versy as Helvering v. Clifford.' Since experts have thoroughly dissected the
case,2 to discuss the decision at length is pointless, but in view of the heated
comment which the decision has evoked, it may be profitable to see what the
courts have done with the doctrine since it was announced.
The Clifford case was another battle in the Treasury's war on those tax-
payerg who seek to minimize income taxes by using trusts to reallocate their
income. The first battle came when Congress provided by Section 219 (g)
(h) of the Revenue Act of 19243 that the grantor should be taxable on the
income of trusts to pay premiums of insurance policies on his life ;4 of trusts
where the grantor, alone or in conjunction with any person not a beneficiary,
could direct payment of the income to himself or accumulation for his future
benefit; and of trusts where the grantor "at any time during the taxable year",
alone or in conjunction with any person "not a beneficiary", could revest the
3sSupra note 33. However, where the executor elects the optional valuation date for
the estate tax of one year after the decedent's death [INT. REv. CODE § 811 (g) (1939)],
a separate valuation of the property at the date of death would still have to be made
in order to apply the newly announced basis.
39The Court's straightforward treatment of the present problem is at variance with
the Court's treatment of alimony trusts. Today whether income of an alimony trust is
to be taxable to the husband-settlor depends on whether under local divorce law the
creation of the trust in favor of the wife effects an absolute discharge of the husband's
duty of support. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935); Helvering
v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80, 60 Sup. Ct. 780 (1940) ; Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149,
60 Sup. Ct. 427 (1939); Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69, 60 Sup. Ct 784 (1940).
See also, Paul, Five Years With Douglas v. Willcuts (1939) 53 HARv. L. REv. 1.
1309 U. S. 331, 60 Sup. Ct. 554 (1940).2Ray, The Income Tax on Short Term and Revocable Trusts (1940) 53 HARv. L.
RFv. 1322; PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (3d Series 1940) 194-213.
843 STAT. 277 (1924).4Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53 Sup. Ct. 761 (1933), held this provision constitu-
tional.
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corpus of the trust in himself at any time during the taxable year.5 Taxpayers
soon learned, however, that trusts which were revocable with the consent of a
beneficiary having a very minor interest ;6 trusts which were revocable by a
third person in favor of the grantor; and trusts which were revocable by
notice of a year and a day,7 were not within the provisions of this act. Congress
filled the first two gaps by Section 166 of the Revenue Act 1932,8 which
changed "any person not a beneficiary" to "any person not having a sub-
stantial adverse interest,"9 and added a provision taxing the grantor on the
income of trusts which were revocable by a person not having a substantial
adverse interest; it filled the third gap by Section 166 of the Revenue Act of
1934,10 which struck out the words "during the taxable year."11 The Treasury
also proposed in 1934 that the income of short term trusts be expressly taxed
to the grantor, but Congress refused to adopt the proposal. It was in this
setting that the Clifford decision was handed down.
In the Clifford case, the taxpayer set up an irrevocable five year trust, the
income payable to his wife, and the corpus to revert to him at the end of that
time. The taxpayer himself was trustee with extensive powers of management.
5Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376, 50 Sup. Ct. 336 (1930) and Reinecke v. Smith,
289 U. S. 172, 53 Sup. Ct. 570 (1933) held this provision constitutional.
6Smith v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 1st 1932).7 Since notice of a year and a day was required, they were not revocable within the
taxable year, and so not within the statute. Lewis v. White, 56 F. (2d) 290 (D. Mass.
1932) ; White v. Lewis, 61 F. (2d) 1046 (C. C. A. 1st 1932); Langley v. Commissioner,
61 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
847 STAT. 221 (1932).9 See Fulham v. Commissioner, 110 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A. 1st 1940) where a life
beneficiary to whom the trustee might pay principal or income, was held not to have a
substantial adverse interest.
3048 STAT. 729 (1934).
1 1The present sections of the Internal Revenue Code are: 53 STAT. 68 (1939), 26 U. S. C.
§ 166 (1940). "Where at any time the power to revest in the grantor title to any part
of the corpus of the trust is vested-
(1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a sub-
stantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income
therefrom, or
(2) in any person not havihg a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such
part of the corpus or the income therefrom,
then the income of such part of the trust shall be included in computing the net income of
the grantor." And 53 STAT. 68 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 167 (1940). "(a) Where any part
of the income of a trust-
(1) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income may be, held or
accumulated for future distribution to the grantor; or
(2) may, in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income, be distributed to
the grantor; or
(3) is, or in the discretion of the grantor or of any person not having a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the income may be, applied to
the payment of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor...
then such part of the income of the trust shall be included in computing the net income
of the grantor.
"(b) As used in this section, the term 'in the discretion of the grantor' means 'in
the discretion of the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a
substantial adverse interest in the disposition of the part of the income in question'."
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It was conceded that the trust was not for support,' 2 and the Court did not
consider Sections 166 and 167.13 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declared
that the income of this trust was taxable to the grantor as substantially the
owner of the corpus for the purposes of Section 22 (a) of the Revenue Act
of 1934,14 which contained the broad definition of gross income.15
The Clifford case has been assailed as judicial legislation. 16 It has been
denounced as destroying all certainty in tax law.1 7  It is to the second
criticism that this note is addressed.
In its opinion in the Clifford case, the Court said: "Our point here is that
no one fact is normally decisive but that all considerations and circumstances
of the kind we have mentioned are relevant to the question of ownership and
are appropriate foundations for findings on that issue."' 8  Thus, the Court
left each case to be decided on its own facts, with the line to be drawn by the
slow course of later decisions. This note will examine some of the subsequent
decisions in an effort to see how the lower courts have dealt with the problem
which was delegated to them, and attempt to find any guideposts which
may have been erected for the taxpayer.
In the Clifford case, the Court stressed three elements: the short term of the
trust; the broad powers of management exercised by the grantor-trustee; and
the fact that the money stayed within the family group. Professor Magill,
writing shortly after the decision,19 expressed the opinion that all three ele-
ments would be necessary to bring subsequent cases within the Clifford
doctrine. The lower courts have cast doubt upon this conclusion, and seem
inclined to extend the Clifford doctrine.
Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d 1941), is illustrative.
The taxpayer created a trust, with income to his wife for life, remainder to
his children. A bank was named trustee, but the grantor reserved power to
remove the trustee and to direct the management of the trust fund. In addi-
tion, the grantor reserved the power, not present in the Clifford case, to alter
12 See Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 59 (1935), where a husband was
taxed on the income of a trust for the support of his divorced wife.
13 1n Helvering v. Wood, 309 U. S. 344, 60 Sup. Ct. 551 (1940), the income of term
trusts was held not taxable to the grantor under Section 166, the Court distinguishing
betveen a reversion and a power to revoke. Compare Knapp v. Hoey, infra, note 21.
1448 STAT. 686 (1934).
15The present Revenue Code contains substantially the same definition of gross income
as the Revenue Act of 1934. 53 STAT. 9 (1939), 26 U. S. C. § 22 (a) (1940). "General
Definition--'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages,
or compensation for personal service (including personal service as an officer or employee
of a State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of any
one or more of the foregoing), of whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from
professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such
property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any businfss
carried on for gain or profit, or gains and profits and income derived from any source
whatever ....
'
6 See Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting, in Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, at 338
(1940).
17 See PAUL, op. cit. supra note 2 at 207-213.
18309 U. S. 331, at 336, 60 Sup. Ct. 554, at 557.
'OMagill, The Supreme Court on Federal Taxation, 1939-40 (1940) 8 U. OF CHI. L.
REv. 1, at 5.
1941]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
or amend the provisions of the trust relating to the distribution of income or
principal, except that this power could not be exercised to revoke the trust, to
revest title to the principal in him, or to direct that the income be paid to
him, accumulated for him, or applied to the payment of insurance premiums
on his life.
The Board of Tax Appeals, 20 in a decision banded down before the Clifford
case, held that the power to alter the trust did not make the income taxable
to the grantor under Sections 166 and 167, relying mainly on Knapp v. Hoey,21
and quite summarily disposed of the argument that the income was taxable
to the grantor under Section 22 (a).
The Second Circuit reversed the Board upon the basis of the Clifford
decision.22 In view of the power of the grantor to direct the management of
the fund, there was no basis for distinction in the fact that a bank was trustee.
In discussing the length of the trust as compared to the five year term in the
Clifford case, the court said: "But the decisions of the Supreme Court disclose
that the dominant fact, in the family group cases, is the extent of the donor's
actual control. We conclude that the control factor is sufficiently present
when the trust is of short duration, as in the Clifford case (because the grantor
will soon reacquire complete dominion), even if there are no express reserva-
tions of control; while, if the trust is of long duration, then the doner is to be
regarded as the 'owner', if he expressly reserved as here, a very substantial
measure of control of the disposition of the income. '23
The court also relied upon the theory of Helvering v. Horst that the power
to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of that income, and re-
peatedly emphasized the power of the donor to alter the disposition of principal
and income. According to the Board of Tax Appeals, 25 this was the turning
point of the case. Other decisions confirm this conclusion.
In Commissioner v. Branch,26 the taxpayer set up a trust for his wife for
life, and made himself trustee with broad powers of management, but the wife
rather than the grantor had the power to appoint the remainder by will, to
appoint the corpus to new uses, and to vest the corpus in anyone she saw fit.
The court held that the income was not taxable to the grantor, saying:
"Where the grantor has stripped himself of all command over the income for
an indefinite period, and in all probability, under the terms of the trust instru-
ment, will never regain beneficial ownership of the corpus, there seems to be
no statutory basis for treating the income as that of the grantor under Section
22 (a) merely because he has made himself trustee with broad power in that
capacity to manage the trust estate. '27 The same result has been reached
20Ellsworth B. Buck, 41 B. T. A. 99 (1940).
21104 F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 2d 1939). The Supreme Court has not yet passed on this
question. See Estate of Sanford v. Commissioners, 308 U. S. 39, 60 Sup. Ct. 51 (1939).22 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U. S. 552, 61 Sup. Ct. 719 (1941) held that it was proper
for the circuit courts to consider Section 22 (a), although it had not been considered by
the Board. The Hormel case was sent back to the Board for further findings of fact,
but there would seem to be no such difficulty in the Buck case, since Section 22 (a) was
considered by the Board.
23120 F. (2d) 775, at 778.
24311 U. S. 112, 61 Sup. Ct. 144 (1940). See Note (1941) 26 CoRNELL L. Q. 510.
2 5 John N. Fulham, 44 B. T. A. No. 182, Aug. 6, 1941.
26114 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 1st 1940).
27114 F. (2d) 985, at 987.
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where the power to alter the trust instrument was in a committee of three,28
or where there was no power to alter the instrument.29 But where, as in the
Buck case, the grantor of a trust for a family beneficiary has reserved not only
powers of management but also power to alter, he has been taxed on the trust
income, even though the trust was for life.80
One case has treated a twenty year trust in the same way as life trust, holding
broad powers of management and a family beneficiary not enough to make the
income taxable to a grantor who had reserved no power to alter or amend
the trust instrument.3
Where the trust is for ten years,8 2 or less,8 3 however, the Clifford case has
been regarded as controlling, and the grantor who retains broad powers of
management, when establishing a trust for the benefit of someone within the
family group, has been taxed on the income of the trust, although he reserved
no power to alter or amend. Even if the grantor has few or no managerial
powers, he may still be taxed. The dictum in the Buck case that if the trust
was for a short term, and the beneficiaries were in the family group, the grantor
would be taxable on the income without an express reservation of control,
was seized upon and approved in Helvering v. Elias,3 4 where the trust was for
six and one-half years and the beneficiaries were the grantor's children, and in
Commissioner v. Barbour,3 5 where the trust was for six years and the bene-
ficiaries were grantor's wife and children. In both these cases, the trust income
was held taxable to the grantor, although there was no reservation of control
in the trust instrument.3 6 In Conimissioner v. Jonas,37 however, the grantor
was not taxable on the income of a ten year trust for her two adult sons,
where she retained no power to alter the trust instrument or to direct the
management of the trust.
The income of a short term trust has not been taxable to the grantor where
there was neither a reservation of control to the grantor nor a beneficiary within
the family group. In Elizabeth 'K. Lamont,8  the grantor set up one year
trusts for the benefit of three cousins and an unrelated person, none of whom
was a member of her household, and none of whom she was under any obliga-
tion to support. Other beneficiaries were educational, charitable, and religious
organizations. The grantor's sole power was to substitute securities of equal
value. The Board held that the grantor was not taxable on the income of the
trust. A similar result was reached where a five year trust was set up for an
28John N. Fulham, 44 B. T. A. No. 182, Aug. 6, 1941.
29Carelton H. Palmer, 40 B. T. A. 1002 (1939), af'd, 115 F. (2d) 368 (C. C. A. 2d
1940) ; Frederick Ayer, 45 B. T. A. No. 26, Sept. 18, 1941; Mary W. Pingree, 45 B. T. A.
No. 6, Sept. 5, 1941; Lolita S. Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777 (1940).
3OWhite v. Higgins, 116 F. (2d) 312 (C. C. A. 1st 1940) ; Morton Stein, 41 B. T. A.
994 (1940).31Jones v. Norris, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv., Uf 62, 882 (C. C. A. 10th 1941).32Commissioner v. Berolzheimer, 116 F. (2d) 628 (C. C. A. 2d 1940); Snowden A.
Fahnestock, 42 B. T. A. 569 (1941).33Reuter v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 698 (C. C. A. 5th 1941) ; Penn v. Commissioner,
109 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).
344 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f 62, 862 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
354 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 62, 855 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).86Accord, Archibald G. Bush, 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941).
374 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax. Serv. Uf 62, 860 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
8 43 B. T. A. 61 (1940).
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educational corporation and the grantor reserved no control, 89 and where
three and five year trusts were set up for a sister-in-law and an uncle, the
grantor retaining no control.40
These cases indicate that the limits of the "family group" have been set
at the household of the grantor. A sister-in-law and an uncle,4 cousins,4
and a married daughter,43 are outside it. A beneficiary whom the grantor has
supported prior to the creation of the trust, however, may fall within the
family group, whether or not he would normally do so.
44
Certain tentative conclusions may be drawn from a study of the decisions
which have so far interpreted the Clifford case. Where the trust is for life,
or a term as long as twenty years, apparently there must be in addition to a
beneficiary within the family group and a reservation to the grantor of powers
of management, the further reservation to him of power to alter the terms of
the trust instrument before he may be taxed upon the income of the trust.
But where the trust is for ten years or less, it seems that the grantor may be
taxed even though he has reserved no power to alter or amend. Where the
term of the trust is as short as six or seven years and the beneficiaries are in
the family group, the income may be taxable to the grantor even though he
reserves neither power to alter nor powers of management. But the income
of a trust for even one year has not been taxed to the grantor where there was
neither a family beneficiary nor a reservation of control to the grantor. The
reference in the Buck case to the "family group" cases implies that a short term
is no longer considered the essential element for taxing income of a trust to
the grantor under Section 22 (a), but rather "the prime consideration is
whether the income remains within the family."45 The term of the trust is
important now only as indicating whether it is necessary to find further reserva-
tion of power to alter or manage in order to tax the trust income to the
grantor.
Of course, certain questions remain unanswered. What would be the
result where the trust was for five years for the benefit of a charity, and the
grantor reserved the power to manage but not to alter? Would the reserva-
tion of control outweigh the absence of a family beneficiary? Where will the
line be drawn in the shadow zone between ten year trusts where reservation of
power to alter has not been necessary to taxation, and twenty year trusts,
where it has been considered essential? What of the gap between six and one-
half year trusts, where the grantor has been taxed without a reservation of
control if the beneficiary was within the family group, and ten year trusts,
where control has been regarded as essential?
But although the lower courts, in expanding the Clifford doctrine, have not
yet answered these questions, they seem to be drawing reasonably clear lines of
39Helvering v. Achelis, 112 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 2d 1940).4 0Dunlevy Milbank, 41 B. T. A. 1014 (1940).
41lbid.
4 2Elizabeth K Lamont, 43 B. T. A. 61 (1940).
43Lolita S. Armour, 41 B. T. A. 777 (1940).4 4Commissioner v. Wooley, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. II 62, 861 (C. C. A.
2d 1941) ; Archibald G. Bush, 43 B. T. A. 535 (1941).4 5 Helvering v. Elias, 4 Prentice-Hall 1941 Fed. Tax Serv. f1 62, 862 (C. C. A. 2d
1941).
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demarcation. If these lines are not erased, the criticism that the Clifford case
has destroyed certainty in one field of tax law may eventually be met without
a resort to Congressional action. Whether the Supreme Court will erase them
remains to be seen.
Kennetlh A. Tifft
Torts: Inducing breach of contract: Justifications.-In the case of Im.-
perial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P. (2d) 631 (Cal. 1941), Coker sold an ice
distributing business, inclusive of good will, to the California Consumers Co.,
covenanting not to compete within a restricted area so long as the purchasers
or anyone deriving title to the good will of the business from the purchasers
should be engaged in that business. Plaintiff acquired title from the California
Consumers Co. including the right to enforce the covenant not to compete.
Subsequently in that area, Coker began to sell ice supplied to him by another
company. Plaintiff brought action for an injunction to restrain Coker from
violating the contract and to restrain such company from inducing Coker
to violate the contract. The complaint alleged that the company had induced
Coker to violate the contract so that they might sell to him at a profit and
that damages would be inadequate. Held: "A party may not, . . . under the
guise of competition actively and affirmatively induce the breach of a competi-
,tor's contract in order to secure an economic advantage over that competitor."'
The complaint states a cause of action and the demurrer of the company
should be overruled.
The general rule is that an action will lie for inducing breach of contract by
a resort to means in themselves unlawful, such as libel, slander, fraud, physical
violence, or threats of such action.2  Where the only means used lie in
persuasion which does not amount to intimidation the majority rule recognizes
liability, unless the defendant is justified by the exercise of an equal or superior
right,3 but the minority does not recognize liability for such interference with
relationships other than that of master and servant.4 Previous to the Rossier
case, California had adhered to the minority rule on the basis of Boyson v.
Thorn,5 but the court in the Rossier case stated: "The statements [in the
Boyson case] to the effect that no interference with contractual relations is
actionable if the means employed are otherwise lawful were not necessary
'112 P. (2d) at 633.2Diver v. Miller, 4 W. W. Harr. 207, 148 Ati. 291 (Del. Sup. 1929) ; Minnesota Stove
Co. v. Cavanaugh, 31 Minn. 458, 155 N. W. 638 (1915) ; Stebbins v. Edwards, 101 Old.
188, 224 Pac. 714 (1924). See also RE-STATEmENT, TORTS (1939) §§ 766, 777.
3Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 106 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A. 10th 1939) ; Hauss-
mann v. Colonial Trust Co., 23 F. Supp. 213 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) ; Meadowmoor Dairies
v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939) ; Associated Flour
Haulers v. Hoffman, 282 N. Y. 173, 26 N. E. (2d) 7 (1940) ; Chitwood v. McMillan, 189
S. C. 262, 1 S. E. (2d) 162 (1939).4Brooks v. Patterson, 234 Ky. 757, 29 S. W. (2d) 26 (1930) ; Hartman v. Greene, 193
La. 234, 190 So. 390 (1939) ; Glencoe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Commission
Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S. W. 93 (1897) ; Carolina Motor Service v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 210 N. C. 36, 185 S. E. 479 (1936); Wedwik v. Russell-Miller Milling Co., 64
N. D. 690, 256 N. W. 107 (1934).
598 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 492 (1893).
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to the decision and should be disregarded," 6 indicating an adoption of the
majority rule.
What grounds today excuse conduct which induces the breach of another's
contract? 7 One judge has stated: "I think it would be extremely difficult,
even if it were possible, to give a complete and satisfactory definition of what
is 'sufficient justification', and most attempts to do so would probably be
mischievous." 8 Justifiable grounds, however, can apparently be grouped into
two major classifications with minor subdivisions.
I. Where the defendant seeks to further his own interests.
(a). Competition. Every act done by a business man in diverting trade
from competitors is intentionally done and injures competitors. It is a
privilege and not a right, therefore he must act fairly. "When one has knowl-
edge of the contract rights of another, his wrongful inducement of a breach
thereof is a willful destruction of the property of another and cannot be
justified on the theory that it enhances and advances the business interests of
the wrongdoer. Fraud, obstruction, molestation, or the willful and in-
tentional procurement of violation of contractual relations are practices which
competition does not authorize."9  Thus the intentional inducement of a
breach of contract cannot be justified on the ground of competition,'0 although
the minority rule imposes no liability on one who supplants another in
purchases of land and goods;:" but competition will justify an inducement of a
breach of contract where the competitor was unaware of the contract' 2 or his
acts incidentally caused the breach without genuinely inducing it.'3 Where no
6112 P. (2d) 631, 634 (1941).7For more extended articles on the general topic of inducing a breach of contract see
Sayre, Inducing a Breach of Contract, (1923) 36 HAiv. L. Rv. 663; Carpenter, Inter-ference With Contractual Relations, (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 728. See also PROSSER oN
ToRTs (1941) 972-1036.
The limited scope of this note does not enter into the field of labor relations which
has undergone rather extensive changes since the passage of the National Labor Relations
Act and is in a state of confusion and conflict. Probably the most recent and accurate
work in this field is PROSSER ON TORTS (1941) 1006-1036, in which the author states, at
page 1006: "In general, it may be said that any objective which tends directly and im-
mediately to benefit the workmen in their employment is a legitimate end for a strike."
Also that where there is a definite contract for a term, there has been almost no
recognition of any privilege to interfere, but where terminable at will, as in the case of
ordinary employment, the interests of the union are more recognized. See also RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS (1939) §§ 775-816.
SGlamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation [1903] 2 K. B. 545, 573.9Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 266, 214 N. W. 754 (1927).
itOCalifornia G. Control Board v. California P. Corp., 4 Cal. App. (2d) 242, 40 P. (2d)
846 (1935) ; Nutley v. Hart-Bradshaw Co., 116 Kan. 446, 227 Pac. 254 (1924) ; Lamb
v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920) ; Eddyside Co. v. Seibel, 142 Pa.
Super. 174, 15 A. (2d) 691 (1940). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 768 (2).
"1Swain v. Johnson, 151 N. C. 93, 65 S. E. 619 (1909) ; Carolina Motor Service v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 210 N. C. 36, 185 S. E. 479 (1936); Davis v. Minor, [1846]
2 U. C. Q. B. 464.
I2Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 279 U. S. 303, 48 Sup. Ct. 134 (1927);
Wissmath Packing Co. v. Mississippi River Power Co., 179 Iowa 1309, 162 N. W. 846
(1917) ; Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-made Pants, 113 La. 388, 37 So. 2 (1904) ; Hornstein
v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930).
'sDu-Art Film Lab. v. Consolidated F. Industries, 15 F. Supp. 689 (S. D. N. Y. 1936);
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fixed contract exists, competition justifies a competitor who freely induces
others to become his customers by such fair means as lowering of prices,
offering better service, showing better salesmanship, etc.14
(b). Absolute rights. "Absolute rights are rights incident to the ownership
of property, rights growing out of contractual relations, or the right to refuse
to enter into contractual relations. These rights the individual may exercise
without reference to his motive as to any injury directly resulting therefrom,
since the courts, apparently on the ground of expediency, have consistently
held that such injury is not a legal injury in the sense that it is actionable."' 5
Thus a person may invade the contractual rights of another in protecting his
own contractual rights,10 the ownership or condition of his property,' 7 his
financial interests in the person persuaded,' 8 the ethical standards of his
medical profession,' 9 the exercise of the right to settle his case out of court,2 0
the right to appeal to governmental authorities for redress of bona fide
grievances, 21 or the right to assert an honest claim or bring suit in good
faith.-2 '
(c). Coercion to force plaintiff into complying with his wishes. Such
coercion is not justifiable and thus the defendant is liable where he induces an
employer to discharge an employee in order to compel such employee to pay
Vonnegut Mach. Co. v. Toledo Mach. & Tool Co., 263 Fed. 192 (N. D. Ohio 1920);
Kerr v. Du Pru, 35 Ga. App. 122, 132 S. E. 393 (1926).
'
4Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Texas Elect. Ser. Co., 63 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 5th 1933);
Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. (2d) 1, 44 P. (2d) 1060 (1935) ; Philadelphia Dairy Prod. v.
Quaker City Ice Cream Co., 306 Pa. 164, 159 At. 3 (1932). See also RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1939) § 768 (1).
'
5Quinilivan v. Brown Oil Co., 96 Mont. 147, 155, 29 P. (2d) 374 (1934). As indicated
before, this note does not cover the field of labor relations; but it seems desirable to
state that this quotation no longer applies to labor cases since Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 61 Sup. Ct. 845 (1941). In that case the Supreme Court
held that a corporation's refusal to hire two applicants for jobs, because of their union
membership, was an unfair labor practice even though they had never been employees
of the corporation; that the Board was authorized to order the corporation to cease and
desist from the practice; and that the Board was also authorized to order the corporation
to hire these applicants for work and to compel it to give them "back pay" (a sum equal
to what they normally would have earned from the date of the discrimination to the time
of employment, less their earnings during that period).
'OQuinilivan v. Brown Oil Co., 96 Mont. 147, 29 P. (2d) 374 (1934); Williams v.
Adams, 250 App. Div. 603, 295 N. Y. Supp. 86 (1st Dep't 1937); National Life &
Accident Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 162 Okl. 174, 21 P. (2d) 492 (1933) ; Caskie v. Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Co., 334 Pa. 33, 5 A. (2d) 368 (1939).
'
1 Winters v. University Dist. B. & L. Ass'n, 268 Ill. App. 147 (1932); O'Brien v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 62 Wash. 598, 114 Pac. 441 (1911).
18 Petit v. Cuneo, 290 Ill. App. 16, 7 N. E. (2d) 774 (1937) ; Knapp v. Penfield, 143
Misc. 132, 256 N. Y. Supp. 41 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, 105 N. J. L. 345,
144 Atl. 715 (1929).
19 Porter v. King County Medical Soc., 186 Wash. 410, 58 P. (2d) 367 (1936).2 0 Herbits v. Const. Indemnity Co., 279 Mass. 539, 181 N. E. 723 (1932) ; Klauder v.
Cregar, 327 Pa. 1, 192 Atl. 667 (1937).2 iKelley v. Morris County Traction Co., 126 Atl. 24 (N. J. Sup. Ct. 1924) ; McKee v.
Hughes, 133 Tenn. 455, 181 S. W. 930 (1916).2 2Elvington v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 191 N. C. 515, 132 S. E. 274 (1926) ; Hardin v.
Majors, 246 S. W. 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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defendant a debt,23 force him to compromise a claim, 24 prevent his bringing
suit,25 or in order to extort money from him. 26
II. Where the defendant seeks to further interests other than his own.
(a). Protection of public health, morals, and safety. Such social interest
prevails over the social interest in protecting an individual's contractual rights.
Defendant has not been held liable where the purpose of the interference was
to prevent prostitution,2 7 improper public entertainment, 28 the spread of
disease,29 the charging of extortionate prices for necessities of life,3 0 or to
enforce rules of a public utility designed for the safety and comfort of the
public3 1 In one case the defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct for
picketing the landlord's premises because of "fire-trap" conditions. The basis
of the decision, however, rested on the ground that the orderly thing for a
tenant to do was to file a complaint with the proper municipal department,
but nothing was said as to what the decision would be if such orderly action did
not bring about the desired result.3 2
(b). Disinterested advice. Superior public and private interests exist in
freedom of communication and friendly intercourse and in certain professions
or businesses (lawyer, doctor, banker, etc.). Where requested, therefore,
defandant may give bona fide advice to withdraw from a contract,3 8 but will
be liable if the advice is given with a spiteful motive.34
(c). Performance of duty. Society has a strong interest in compelling
people to perform their duties. Thus an agent protecting the interests of his
principal,3 5 an employer those of this employee,3 6 a supervisor, principal and
superintendent reporting the conduct of a teacher,37 and a broker obeying an
exchange's edict resulting from a government order 38 have been protected
although their acts interfered with another's contractual rights.
(d). Discipline and responsibility for the welfare of another. A person in
231n re Eaton's Estate, 159 App. Div. 81, 144 N. Y. Supp. 257 (3rd Dep't 1913) ; Giblan
v. National Union, [1903] 2 K. B.. 600.24U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732 (1921) ; London
Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ili. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (1903).25johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 158 Wis. 56, 147 N. W. 32 (1914).2 6Hill Grocery Co. v. Carroll, 223 Ala. 376, 136 So. 789 (1931) ; Doucette v. Sallinger,
228 Mass. 444, 117 N. E. 897 (1917).2 7 Brimelow v. Casson, [1924] 1 Ch. 302.
2sScott v. Gamble, [1916] 2 K. B. 504.2 9 Legris v. Marcotte, 129 Ill. App. 67 (1906).
80Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N. Y. Supp. 250 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
3 1Lancaster v. Hambuger, 70 Ohio St. 156, 71 N. E. 289 (1904).32 People v. Kopezak, 153 Misc. 187, 274 N. Y. Supp. 629 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 266
N. Y. 565, 195 N. E. 202 (1935).3 3Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Switchman's Union, 158 Fed. 541 (W. D. N. Y. 1907);
Northern Wis. Co-Op. v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571, 197 N. W. 936 (1924); Glamorgan
Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Federation, [1903] 1 K. B. 118.
3 4 Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N. W. 869 (1895). See also RESTATEamNT,
ToRTs (1939) § 772.
85 Said v. Butt, [1920] 3 K. B. 497.3 6 Gregory v. Dealers' Equip. Co., 156 Tenn. 273, 300 S. W. 563 (1927).3 7 Caverno v. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331, 15 N. E. (2d) 483 (1938).
85Garcia Sugar Corp. v. New York C. & S. Exchange, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 532 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
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authority should be allowed to fairly discipline or to look out for the welfare
of another, whether it be physical, moral or economic, without fear of liability
for the incidental interference with contractual rights.3 9 Thus the principal
of a school, 4° officers of a college,41 officers of a church,42 and the governor
of a soldier's home43 have not been held liable in the exercise of such power.
(e). Protection of character or reputation. Society has a superior interest
in the bona fide protection of the good character and reputation of an individual
or society. Thus church leaders inducing a radio station to prevent the use
of the station by a broadcaster to attack the church and misrepresent its
teachings, 44 and a person inducing the breach of a contract to prevent a girl
from becoming a prostitute45 have not been held liable for their interference.
(f). Marriage contracts. Hasty and ill-advised marriages are undesirable
since society has a vital interest in having the marital relationship endure.
"'The state has an interest in the marriage relationship and until the marriage
is solemnized no domestic rights exist, and therefore cannot be violated.' "46
Thus a parent, rival lover, and even a stranger have not been held liable for
inducing the breach of a contract to marry.4 7
(g). Contracts in violation of public policy. Society can not permit con-
tracts to be made or enforced that violate a well defined public policy, and
therefore will not protect them from invasion. Thus a competitor inducing
the breach of a contract in restraint of trade,48 a bar association exposing
usurious loans, 49 or a person inducing the breach of a wagering contract have
not been held liable.50 But where the contract is merely unenforceable because
of a lack of compliance with the statute of frauds, 5' lack of consideration, 52 or
uncertainty of terms53 the defendant will be liable for interference unless he
can show some other justification. Where the contract is terminable at *ill
there is a split of authority, the majority holding that interference with such
contracts is actionable.
54
3 9REsTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) § 770.
40Jones v. Cody, 132 Mich. 13, 92 N. W. 495 (1902).41Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S. W. 204 (1913).42Kuryer Pub. Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N. W. 948 (1916).43Rowan v. Butler, 171 Ind. 28, 85 N. E. 714 (1908).44Watch Tower Bible & Tract Soc. v. Dougherty, 337 Pa. 286, 11 A. (2d) 147 (1940).45Brimelow v. Casson, (1924] 1 Ch. 302.
46Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 427, 169 N. E. 491 (1929).
47Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N. E. 491 (1929); Attridge v. Pembroke,
235 App. Div. 101, 256 N. Y. Supp. 257. (4th Dep't 1932) ; Fredenburg v. Fredenburg, 159
Misc. 525, 288 N. Y. Supp. 377 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
48Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376 (1911);
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Texas Elect Serv. Co., 63 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. 5th 1933).49Gunnels v. Atlantic Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 12 S. E. (2d) 602 (1940).
50Joe Lee v. Lord Dalmeny [1927] 1 Ch. 300. See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939)
§ 774.51Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 120 Md. 381, 87 Atl. 927 (1913); Ringler
v. Ruby, 117 Ore. 455, 244 Pac. 509 (1926).52Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125 (1901) ; Rich v. New York Cent &
Hud. Riv. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. 382 (1882).53Aalfo Co. v. Kinney, 105 N. J. L. 345, 144 AtI. 715 (1929).54Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1916)
(contract of employment) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala.
147, 89 So. 732 (1921) ; Meltzer v. Keminer, 131 Misc. 813, 227 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup.
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(h). Racial dispute. One lower federal court held that the picketing and'
boycotting of a store by persons other than employees to compel the employ-
ment of colored persons was not a labor dispute and could be enjoined, 55 but
the Supreme Court held such a controversy to be a labor dispute and denied
the injunction.56
(i). Nationality or patriotism. Apparently this is not a justifiable ground.
Defendants in one case were held liable for ruining a person's business by
spreading rumors that such person was pro-German, a disloyal citizen, etc. 57
Edward R. Moran
Trade-Mark and Trade-Name: Unfair Competition.-In Lone Ranger,
Inc. v. Cox, 39 F. Supp. 487 (W. D. S. C. 1941), the plaintiff owned the
copyright for both the radio serial and the comic strip entitled "The Lone
Ranger" with the principal character named the Lone Ranger who rides a
white horse and speaks the lines, "Hi-Yo Silver" and "Hi-Yo Silver, Away."
It claimed the exclusive right to the trade-mark or trade-name, "The Lone
Ranger" which it had registered. The plaintiff, by license to Republic
Productions, Inc., granted the right to produce and distribute the motion
picture serial "The Lone Ranger" and the movie, "Hi-Yo Silver." Lee Powell,
an actor, and one of the defendants actually played the part of "The Lone
Ranger" in the pictures. Subsequently, Powell has been employed by the
other defendant, Cox, doing business as Wallace Brothers Circus. Powell
has appeared in advertisements and the circus on a white horse as "Lee Powell,
the Original Lone Ranger of Talking Pictures" and used the expression
"Hi-Yo Silver" in his personal appearances. A suit in equity was brought
by the plaintiff seeking to enjoin' the defendants from infringing upon their
copyrights, from interference with plaintiff's alleged exclusive rights to trade-
marks and trade-names, and from unfair competition with plaintiff's business.
Held: Injuriction denied.2
Ct. 1927) ; George Jonas Glass v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 77 N. J. Eq. 219, 79 Atl.
262 (1911).
Contra: McGuire v. Gerstley, 204 U. S. 489, 27 Sup. Ct. 332 (1907) (partnership
terminable at will) ; Harris v. Hirschfield, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 204, 56 P. (2d) 1252 (1936).55New Negro Alliance v. Grocery Co., 92 F. (2d) 510 (App. D. C. 1937).56New Negro Alliance v. Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938).
57Swartz v. Kay, 89 W. Va. 641, 109 S. E. 822 (1921).
'From collateral sources, the writer is informed that the plaintiff also asked for
$250,000 as damages. The Pennsylvania District Court decree, referred to on page 494
of the principal case, was not reported as it was in the nature of a consent matter
and no opinion was written.
2The writer is informed by counsel for defendant that conclusions of law found by the
District Judge in the principal case, but not reported are as follows: "(1) That the
defendants, by their acts, have not infringed any copyright of the plaintiff as alleged
and proved. (2) That the defendants are not unlawfully interfering with an exclusive
right of the plaintiff to a certain trade-mark and trade name. (3) That the defendants
are not engaged in unfair competition with the plaintiff. (4) That the plaintiff, having
licensed the Republic Productions, Inc. to use its copyrighted work in the production of
two talking pictures and the Republic Productions, Inc., having employed one of the
defendants, Lee Powell, as an actor to play the part of The Lone Ranger, the said
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This note is concerned with the problem of trade-mark and trade-name
infringement along with the broader field of unfair competition raised in the
principal case. The law of trade-mark and trade-name is but a part of the
broader law of unfair competition.3
Mere adoption of a trade-mark or trade-name, apart from its use in connec-
tion with an existing business, does not entitle one to protection in equity
against its use. A name may become so used in the business or identified with
a certain manufacturer that its appropriation will constitute an infringement.4
It is the business along with the good will and reputation that the courts seek
to protect from encroachment rather than a particular trade-mark or trade-
name.6 The general rule is that as between conflicting claimants to the use
of the same mark or name, the priority of appropriation determines the ques-
tion. 6 There is no exclusive right in gross7 to the use of a particular name,
but a subsequent user will not be allowed to adopt a name in connection with
a business in actual competition with a prior user or where its use is likely
to mislead the public.8
It is clear that where the parties are actually competing with each other, one
will not be allowed to appropriate the trade-name or trade-mark of the other.9
The gravamen of such action is the diversion of the plaintiff's business by
the defendant, but recent cases have carried the doctrine of unfair competition
defendant, Lee Powell, has a right to refer by announcement, advertisement, performance,
representation, and publication to the fact of his former employment by the Republic
Productions, Inc., and that he acted the part of The Lone Ranger in the two pictures
so produced. (5) That the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for in its
complaint enjoining the defendants from using the expressions 'The Lone Ranger' or
'Hi-Yo Silver' or from appearing in person as 'The Original Lone Ranger of Talking
Pictures.' (6) That the rule to show cause and complaint should be dismissed with
costs and attorneys' fees to the defendants as provided by 17 U. S. C. A. 40."3United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U. S. 90, 39 Sup. Ct. 48 (1918) ; Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 36 Sup. Ct. 357 (1916).4A common name may take on a secondary meaning as representing a particular
product and manufacturer. Little Tavern Shops v. Davies, 116 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A.
4th 1941); S. C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 4th 1941);
Speaker v. Thaler Co., 87 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 7th 1937) ; Wall v. Rolls-Royce of Am.,
4 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3d 1925).5American Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 46 Sup. Ct. 160 (1925) ; Western
Auto Supply Co. v. Knox, 93 F. (2d) 850 (C. C. A. 10th 1937) ; Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. J. G. Menihan Corp., 28 F. Supp. 920 (W. D. N. Y. 1939).6Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 460, 14 Sup. Ct. 151 (1893); McLean v.
Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 24 L. ed. 993 (1877) ; Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, 15
F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 8th 1927).7American Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 46 Sup. Ct. 160 (1925); United
Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248 U. S. 90, 39 Sup. Ct. 48 (1918) ; Bayer Co. v. Shoyer, 27 F.
Supp. 633 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Paris Medicine Co. v. Brewer & Co., 17 F. Supp. 7
(D. C. Mass. 1936).8United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, snpra note 7; Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240
U. S. 403, 36 Sup. Ct. 357 (1916) ; Wiley v. National Broadcasting Co., 31 F. Supp. 568
(N. D. Calif. 1940); Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, 159 Misc. 551,
288 N. Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).9Arrow Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 4th 1941);
White Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System & Corp., 90 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A.
6th 1937) cert. denied, 302 U. S. 720, 58 Sup. Ct. 41 (1937) ; Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v.
Haber, 7 F. Supp. 791 (E. D. N. Y. 1934) ; Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N. Y. 414, 132 N. E.
133 (1921).
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in this field beyond situations where there is an actual diversion of business.1 0
There is no need for the protection of marks or names from use on non-
competing goods, unless there is a likelihood that the public will be misled
as to the source of the infringing goods or where the infringement will cause
some injury to the plaintiff-discredit him or cause financial liability."
Rival tradesmen may lawfully compete for business, but courts are astute to
assert that they have no right to use either imitated devices, or to use other
unfair means to trick people into dealing with them under the mistaken belief
that they are dealing with their rivals. In order to obtain an injunction, the
plaintiff does not have to prove that actual deception resulted, but it is enough
if he shows an intent to deceive or from all the facts that confusion is likely
to arise as to the source of the goods.12 It is not necessary to prove knowledge
of or intent to infringe upon another's trade-mark or trade-name in order to
enjoin such use.13
In light of the authorities, the principal case was decided correctly. Powell
advertised himself as "The Original Lone Ranger of Talking Pictures," thereby
making it clear that he had no intention of attempting to associate himself with
the Lone Ranger of radio and comic fame. The plaintiff failed to show actual
competition or that the public was likely to be or actually was misled by any
statement made by the defendants either in his personal appearances or by
advertisements.
Assuming, however, that the plaintiff proved his case of infringement
and unfair competition, let us consider what the measure of recovery would
have been. The courts divide the recovery into (a) accounting of defendant's
profits and (b) damages for losses otherwise sustained. As a general rule,
only the willful infringer of the trade-mark or name is liable for damages or
to account for profits. 4
The plaintiff would be entitled to recover damages at law for any actual
injury caused him by the defendant. The cases, however, are primarily
brought in equity to enjoin the further infringement and to seek recovery of
'OBeech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. 3d 1925) aff'd,
273 U. S. 629, 47 Sup. Ct. 481 (1926); Wall v. Rolls-Royce of Am., 4 F. (2d) 333
(C. C. A. 3d 1925); Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A.
2d 1917), cert. denied, 245 U. S. 672, 38 Sup. Ct. 222 (1917).
1 1 General Shoe Corp. v. Rosen, 111 F. (2d) 95 (C. C. A. 4th 1940), rehearing denied,
112 F. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 4th 1940); Del Monte Special Food Co. v. Calif. Packing Corp.,
34 F. (2d) 774 (C. C. A. 9th 1924); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509
(C. C. A. 6th 1924), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 706, 47 Sup. Ct. 98 (1926) ; Schechter, The
Rational Basis. of Trade-Mark Protection (1926) 40 HAMy. L. REv. 813.
12 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., v. Rosen, 108 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 6th 1940); Gardella
v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 2d 1937) ; Merriam Co. v. Soalfield,
198 Fed. 369 (C. C. A. 6th 1912), aff'd, 241 U. S. 22, 36 Sup. Ct. 477 (1916).1 3Hecker H-O Co. v. Holland Food Corp., 36 F. (2d) 767 (C. C. A. 2d 1939),
affirming, 31 F. (2d) 794 (S. D. N. Y. 1929) ; Queens Mfg. Co. v. Isaac Ginsberg &
Bros., 25 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 8th 1928).
'
4Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 6th 1925); Pease v.
Scott County Mill Co., 5 F. (2d) 524 (E. D. Mo. 1925); P. E. Sharpless Co. v.
Lawrence, 213 Fed. 423 (C. C. A. 3d 1914) ; 96 A. L. R. 645 (1935). Cf. Gehl v. Hebe
Co., 276 Fed. 271 (C. C. A. 7th 1921). For discussion of punitive and exemplary
damages see: Hennessy v. Wilmerding-Lowe Co., 103 Fed. 90 (N. D. Cal. 1900);
Tuzzolino Food Products Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 108 Mont. 408, 91 P. (2d) 415
(1939).
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damages incidental to the prayer for an injunction, reliance being placed upon
the power of the equity court to give complete relief, once it has taken juris-
diction. Where the plaintiff seeks to recover as damages his lost profits based
on an injury to a property right, he has the burden of proving by competent
and sufficient evidence his lost sales, that he was compelled to reduce prices,
or that his business suffered from the inferior quality of the defendants'
product. There is no presumption, here, of law or fact that plaintiff would
have made the sales the defendant did, as in the case of an accounting, nor
does it follow that because a person buys at a lower price he would have
purchased the same article at a higher price. As a practical matter, it is quite
difficult for a plaintiff to prove such damages by competent and sufficient evi-
dence, in comparison with his burden of proof in cases where he asks an
accounting.' 5
In equity, if the plaintiff asks for an accounting of defendant's profits, the
infringer may be required to account for his gains and profits upon a principle
analogous to that which charges a trustee with the profits acquired iii the use
of the property of the cestui que trust. All the plaintiff has to do is to show
the amount of the defendant's sales and the defendant has the burden of
proving his expenses to be deducted in arriving at the plaintiff's award.
Plaintiff does not have to show what proportions of the defendant's profits
are attributable to the infringement, as the courts will award him all the
profits accruing to the defendant by reason of his wrongful appropriation of
the plaintiff's ideas, etc. 16
In England, the rule seems to be that the aggrieved party can not have both
profits and damages, but must make an election between the two. In this
country, it is generally held that both damages and profits may be awarded. 17
If the plaintiff can show that over and above the defendant's profits he has
suffered injury, he should be allowed to recover in damages for such addi-
tional injury. The difficulty, as far as the plaintiff is concerned, is in proving
these damages by sufficient evidence.' 8 Ronald E. Coleman
'
5 Hamilton-Brown v. Wolf Bros., 240 U. S. 251, 36 Sup. Ct. 269 (1916) ; Alladin Mfg.
Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of Am., 116 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 7th 1941); Anchor Stove
& Range Co. v. Rymer, 97 F. (2d) 689 (C. C. A. 6th 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 653,
59 Sup. Ct. 246 (1938) ; Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thum Co., mtpra note 14.1 0Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co. of Am., supra note 15; Trappey v. Mc-
lhenny, 12 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 5th 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 699, 47 Sup. Ct. 94
(1926); Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thum Co., mupra note 14. Accounting or damages have
been denied on basis of laches, estoppel, long delay or no showing of injury sufficient
to justify an accounting: Paris Medicine Co. v. Brewer & Co., 17 F. Supp. 7 (D. C. Mass.
1936) ; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Emens, 16 F. Supp. 816 (S. D. Mich. 1936) ; Nis
ON UNFAIR Co IONa'rrlO" AND TRADE-MARKS (3d ed. 1929) § 424.
17Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., supra note 15; Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle
Lamp Co. of Am., supra note 15. The following cases seem merely to stress the point
that profits and damages should not overlap, thereby giving double recovery: L. Martin
Co. v. L. Martin, etc. Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 257, 72 Atl. 294 (1908); Foster Mfg. Co. v.
Cutter Tower Co., 215 Mass. 136, 101 N. E. 1083 (1913). The Trade-Mark Act of 1905,
33 STAT. 728 (1905), 15 U. S. C. §§ 96, 99 (1939), deals with damages and talks about
triple damages in some instances; 4 SUTHERLAND ON DAMAGES (4th ed. 1916), §§ 1201,
1202.
'
8 Cincinnati Siemans Gas Co. v. Western Siemans Co., 152 U. S. 200, 206, 14 Sup. Ct.
523, 526 (1894) ; Anchor Stove & Range Co. v. Rymer, 97 F. (2d) 689, 690 (C. C. A.
6th 1938); Dickinson v. 0. & W. Thum Co., 8 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 6th 1925).
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